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0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is a financial institution which is observed 
around the world, mainly in developing countries. Bouman (1995) lists about 80 countries in 
which Roscas are known to operate. Roscas flourish in economic settings where formal 
financial institutions seem to fail to meet the needs of a large fraction of the population. In 
general terms, a Rosca can be defined as ‘a voluntary grouping of individuals who agree to 
contribute financially at each of a set of uniformly-spaced dates towards the creation of a 
fund, which will then be allotted in accordance with some prearranged principle to each 
member of the group in turn’ (Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998). Once a member has received 
a fund, also called a pot, she is excluded from the allotment of future pots until the Rosca 
ends. 
The timing of the order of allotment follows one of the following two rules. First, the 
order is determined before or at the first meeting or, second, allotment occurs concurrently at 
each meeting. Depending on the timing of the order of allotment, several allotment 
mechanisms have been observed in practice. In the case of a predetermined order, seniority of 
the participants, negotiation, or a lottery before or at the first meeting (Gugerty, 2000) 
determine the order. When the order is not predetermined, pots are allotted through concurrent 
negotiations or a lottery at each meeting (Gugerty, 2000), the decision of the organiser (Handa 
and Kirton, 1999), or through an auction among those participants who have not yet received 
a pot. In this latter case, the highest bid wins the pot and the price the winner pays is 
distributed among the Rosca members or added to future pots. In accordance with the existing 
literature, Roscas with a lottery and an auction allotment mechanism will be called ‘random 
Roscas’ and ‘bidding Roscas’, respectively. The present dissertation is primarily concerned 
with bidding Roscas. 
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Since the methodological approaches which are taken in this dissertation do not have 
much in common with the large and growing body of anthropological literature describing 
Roscas in many parts of the developing world, we do not review this literature here but refer 
the interested reader to the surveys of Ardener and Burman (1995) and Adams and Fitchett 
(1992). Instead, we will highlight some particular aspects of this literature, which set the stage 
for the chapters to follow. 
Unfortunately, there is no detailed historic account on the evolution of Roscas 
anywhere in the world because, traditionally, the Rosca has been an informal institution. It is 
believed that Roscas started as a very simple financial technology (Geertz, 1962). Today, 
everywhere in the developing world, Roscas come in different forms and levels of 
sophistication. Simple Rosca rules are still frequently observed in contemporary studies (see 
the references above). At the other end of the scale of sophistication are certain bidding 
Roscas in Cameroon, where there is not only an auction for the pot, but also a secondary 
market in which the price a winner has to pay for a pot is lent to another member of the Rosca 
group who offers to pay the highest interest on it (Tchuindjo, 1998). Other case studies from 
this country report Rosca arrangements which have become so flexible that neither the 
number of participants nor the contribution in each round is fixed in advance (Tankou and 
Adams, 1995). 
In India, Roscas seem to have emerged in the southern part of the subcontinent. Today 
they are known throughout the country as ‘chit funds’, or ‘chits’ in short. ‘Chitty’ is a Tamil 
word meaning written piece of paper or palm leaf. In fact, traditionally, there is one written 
piece of paper for each participant, which serves as a lot to determine the order of receipt. 
Radhakrishnan et al. (1975) cite evidence that chit funds had been in existence in the form of 
grain chits well before the introduction of money. Such Roscas in kind still exist, even in 
comparatively well-developed villages as the one studied in Chapter 2. On the other hand, 
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India probably also has the most professionally organised formal Roscas in the world. In 
major cities, large chit fund companies run as many as 10,000 auction Roscas simultaneously. 
These are regulated, just as banks are regulated in the western world. The Chit Fund Act 
obliges every organiser of a Rosca to register with a government authority, to deposit some 
reserves to compensate participants in the case of bankruptcy, and to end auctions 
prematurely at specified bid ceilings (Radhakrishnan, 1977). In consequence, Roscas which 
are not registered with the government are illegal. In rural settings like the village studied in 
Chapter 2, however, Roscas are almost never registered. Perhaps this explains why informal 
Roscas in India have received so little attention from researchers compared to informal 
Roscas in African countries. A notable recent exception, however, is Calomiris and 
Rajaraman (1998). 
For less developed countries, little is known about general participation rates in 
Roscas because, first, Roscas are mostly operated on an informal basis and, in this case, do 
not appear in any financial statistics, and, second, in such countries, large-scale sample 
surveys are typically rare. Even in India, where there is the exemplary National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO) and Roscas play an important role, the NSSO does not canvas 
participation in Roscas. For some African countries, somewhat rough estimates of Rosca 
participation are reported by anthropological authors and range between 45 and 95% of 
households. Gugerty (2000) provides a good, up-to-date survey of this literature. The only 
developed country for which substantial Rosca participation is documented is Taiwan. 
Levenson and Besley (1996) report that, in 1991, about 80% of the households participated in 
at least one Rosca. This does not mean, however, that Roscas are completely unheard of in 
western countries. With the international migration of labour, Roscas seem to have spread to 
any place where people from areas where Roscas traditionally play an important role have 
settled. Ardener and Burman (1995) report Roscas among employees of the International 
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Monetary Fund headquarters in Washington D. C. as well as among Asian immigrants in 
London. 
Little theoretical work has been done on Roscas. This is astounding given the world-
wide prevalence of this institution and the enormous attention devoted to other contractual 
arrangements encountered in the developing world, like sharecropping contracts and 
interlinked transactions. To my knowledge, there are only four papers which use advanced 
analytical tools (Besley et al. 1993, 1994; Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen, 1999; Kuo, 1993), and 
three recent applied papers, which involve simple models (Aliber, 2000; Anderson and 
Balland, 1999; Gugerty, 2000). None of these three latter-mentioned papers involves bidding 
Roscas, which are the subject of this dissertation. Instead, the emphasis is on the analysis of 
primary data on Rosca participation which these authors have collected. In contrast, the 
papers by Besley et al. and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen deal with both random and bidding 
Roscas. It will now be argued that the settings in which these authors analyse bidding Roscas 
are found rarely, if at all, in the real world. 
Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) consider individuals who have an identical, 
deterministic income stream and no access to outside credit. Individual utility is concave in 
current consumption and the funds from a Rosca are used to purchase an indivisible durable 
good which facilitates extra utility in each period after its purchase. The costs of the durable 
require saving for more than one period. Individuals may differ in the utility they derive from 
the durable, but information on this is public. The authors find that identical individuals prefer 
a lottery allotment mechanism, while the bidding allotment mechanism is preferred if the 
valuation for the durable differs sufficiently among the participants. In their framework, the 
auctions in the course of a bidding Rosca serve to identify the bidder with the highest 
valuation for the durable. Since all information is public, the auction does not involve any 
strategic element. The particular auction protocol which Besley et al. design requires that, in a 
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n-person bidding Rosca, all n - 1 auctions take place at the beginning of the Rosca and 
ensures that all participants obtain the same level of utility from joining the Rosca. Its singular 
drawback, as Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) point out, is that it is not reported at all in the 
empirical literature. In my view, the major contribution of Besley et al.'s 1993 paper is to the 
economics of indivisible goods, which had not received much attention in neoclassical 
economics before, and only secondly to the economics of Roscas, as the title of their paper 
would suggest. 
In a companion paper, Besley et al. (1994) use the same indivisible-good framework 
and compare allocations which result from participation in random and bidding Roscas with 
allocations which are feasible when individuals borrow and lend each other money. In this 
paper, they restrict themselves to identical individuals who thus have identical valuations of 
the indivisible good. The authors show that allocations with borrowing and lending are always 
superior to allocations with a bidding Rosca, but that the element of chance inherent in a 
random Rosca may yield allocations which are superior to a credit market. The result on the 
efficiency of bidding Roscas is scarcly surprising since, first, the payoffs of a bidding Rosca 
are less flexible than those of direct borrowing and lending and, second, there is neither 
heterogeneity nor private information on the individuals' valuation of the durable good. 
An approach which is related to Besley et al. (1993) is taken by Kovsted and Lyk-
Jensen (1999), who also assume that all participants have an identical, deterministic income 
stream. Instead of desiring to purchase a durable consumption good, however, their 
participants have prospective investment projects which, once purchased, yield a certain 
revenue but whose fixed costs exceed an individual’s period income. Costly credit from 
outside the Rosca is available and all participants’ preferences are identical. Before the 
beginning of the Rosca, each participant privately observes the revenue of the investment 
project to which he has access. Assuming that nature draws this revenue from the same 
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distribution for all participants, the authors apply the symmetric, independent private value 
(SIPV) approach to analyse the auctions of a bidding Rosca in such an environment. In 
contrast to Besley et al., the strategic analysis of Rosca auctions under Kovsted and Lyk-
Jensen’s assumptions is not trivial because the investment project’s revenue is each bidder’s 
private information. The goal of their paper is to identify criteria which determine whether 
allocations with a random or a bidding Rosca are preferred ex ante, that is, before each 
participant observes his revenue. On the one hand, a random Rosca has the advantage of 
allocating the full pot to each winner, while an auction’s winner in a bidding Rosca has to 
incur costly debt to finance the price he has to pay for the pot. On the other hand, in a bidding 
Rosca, each auction identifies the bidder with the highest revenue, while, with a random 
Rosca, less profitable investment projects may be implemented first. In this connection, the 
authors find that, when outside credit is not too costly, or when the distribution of revenues is 
sufficiently widely dispersed, a bidding Rosca is preferred to a random Rosca. 
It should be remarked that, to solve for the bidding equilibrium of a Rosca, Kovsted 
and Lyk-Jensen consider only first-price sealed bid auctions in which only the winner’s bid is 
revealed. To my knowledge, however, such auctions are not reported in any of the empirical 
literature. Consider, therefore, the frequently-practised oral ascending bid auction. In this 
case, Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen's sequential bidding equilibrium breaks down, because, after 
each auction, the losing bidders, who remain for the next auction, have learned something 
about the revenue of their competitors. For Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen’s equilibrium analysis it 
is essential, however, that, from each bidder’s perspective, all other bidders be identical. 
The approaches to bidding Roscas taken by Besley et al. and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen 
are deterministic in the sense that all payoffs which occur during the course of the Rosca can 
be calculated before the beginning of the first auction because each participant’s income 
stream as well as his preferences (Besley et al.) and his revenue of the investment project 
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(Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen) remain constant from the beginning till the end of the Rosca. As a 
consequence, all auctions can be staged at the beginning of the Rosca and need not take place 
concurrently with allotment, as reported by almost all empirical studies. 
In a stochastic Rosca model, in contrast, random variables which are not yet realised at 
the beginning of the Rosca determine the outcome of each auction. The first stochastic Rosca 
model is due to Kuo (1993), who analyses bidding Roscas when individuals are risk neutral 
and use Rosca funds for consumption. He assumes that individual future consumption is 
discounted with a random discount rate, whereby each individual is assigned a new discount 
rate before each auction. Assuming that the bidders’ discount rates are independently drawn 
from a common distribution before each auction and privately observed, the author applies the 
SIPV framework to derive bidding equilibria. In his model, the advantage of joining a Rosca 
arises from the possibility to consume more in a period in which one has a comparatively high 
marginal utility of current consumption. In this context, the auction is a mechanism to 
overcome information asymmetries. To my knowledge, however, there is no empirical study 
which reports that, in an environment without risk aversion and income uncertainty, Rosca 
funds are used for current consumption. Instead, it appears from the empirical evidence that 
Rosca funds are invariably used for either some lumpy expenditure, be it a consumer durable, 
an investment project or a marriage festival, or for consumption in order to smooth an income 
shock (Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998). 
Based on the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, we claim that the theory papers 
by Besley et al. (1993, 1994), Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999) and Kuo (1993) are irrelevant 
as "applied" theory because they contain essential elements that do not even closely 
correspond to the real world. The aim of this dissertation is to develop models of bidding 
Roscas with more realistic assumptions. There is much empirical evidence in favour of the 
choice of stochastic Rosca models as the basis for analysis. First, as Calomiris and Rajaraman 
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(1998) note, all empirical studies on bidding Roscas except one report auctions which take 
place concurrently with allotment rather than at the beginning of the Rosca. Second, 
deterministic models are not compatible with fluctuating winning bids, which are observed in 
practice. That is to say, a higher winning bid is observed in the t-th than in the (t – 1)-th 
auction. The model of Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen, however, yields the result that, during the 
course of the Rosca, the winning bid decreases from auction to auction. 
The first chapter elaborates on the idea advocated by Calomiris and Rajaraman that 
bidding Roscas can serve as insurance when the participants face income shocks which are 
not perfectly correlated over individuals. In the first chapter, we analyse a bidding Rosca with 
risk averse participants who face identically and independently distributed, privately observed 
incomes which are drawn anew by nature before each meeting. In the context of the existing 
literature, this approach has most in common with Kuo’s. As in his paper, Rosca funds are 
used for consumption and the SIPV framework is applied to analyse Rosca auctions. Our 
approach differs substantially from his, however, in that we consider income shocks instead of 
taste shocks and in that our participants are risk averse whereas his are risk neutral. Moreover, 
while he restricts attention to first-price sealed bid Rosca auctions, we focus on oral ascending 
bid Rosca auctions, which are empirically more relevant and have some particular properties 
which make them substantially different from standard SIPV oral ascending bid auctions. 
In the light of the first chapter, it would have been most desirable to collect Rosca data 
in a setting where participation in bidding Roscas is motivated by the intention to insure 
against income shocks. Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) describe such a Rosca among casual 
labourers in an Indian city. Since the time frame for the field study was limited, however, and 
since I had access to excellent data of a longitudinal study of a south-Indian village (van 
Dillen, forthcoming) including a survey on Rosca activity, I decided to investigate bidding 
Roscas in the said village – although it was quite clear that, within this setting, the insurance 
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aspect of Roscas plays only a minor role. Thanks to the contacts, trust and infrastructure 
established by van Dillen, I managed to collect an extensive dataset on Rosca auctions. 
Comparing the auction outcomes of informal Roscas is particularly difficult, however, 
because, typically, each Rosca is different from any other, be it with respect to the number of 
participants, the amount of the contribution, or the way in which the Rosca organiser is 
remunerated. Therefore, some structure is needed to make the auction outcomes in the dataset 
comparable. To this end, in Chapter 2, we develop a stochastic Rosca model which reflects 
the salient features of Rosca auctions in the study village and estimate the resulting structural 
model by maximum likelihood. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of Rosca 
auctions. 
To summarise, the central idea underlying both chapters is the one of a stochastic 
approach to bidding Roscas in a private information environment. In accordance with much of 
the empirical literature, this is motivated by the persuasion that, so far, economists have 
unfairly neglected the potential which the auction allocation mechanism offers to overcome 
information asymmetries and to respond to shocks or opportunities which cannot be observed 
when a Rosca begins. 
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1 ROSCAS WHEN PARTICIPANTS ARE RISK AVERSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent theoretical research on rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) suggests that 
identical individuals prefer a random to a bidding Rosca when participants save for a lumpy 
durable or an investment good. Here, in contrast, under the assumption that Rosca funds are 
used for consumption, that participants are risk averse, and that their incomes are stochastic, 
independent and privately observed, it is shown that a random Rosca is not advantageous, 
while a bidding Rosca is so if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk 
aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca helps to mitigate the problem of information 
asymmetries. In bidding Roscas, the intertemporal pattern of observed bids depends on 
impatience and risk aversion in a non-trivial way. 
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1.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that in low-income countries risk plays a crucial role in everyday life. 
In the agricultural sector, there is uncertainty about rainfall and crop damage, in the cities, 
casual labourers face employment uncertainty. In both sectors, the prevalence of infectious 
diseases makes labourers’ ability to generate income uncertain. At the same time, poor public 
infrastructure, illiteracy and an inefficient legal system impose limits on the functioning of 
formal market institutions that may insure such risks (see Besley, 1995). While some 
governments try to mitigate aggregate shocks, e.g. by accumulating and releasing food stocks, 
the absence of formal health and unemployment insurance often leaves individuals alone 
when they are affected by idiosyncratic shocks. Because of this lack of formal insurance 
markets, however, numerous nonmarket risk-sharing institutions are observed. The basic idea 
underlying all these institutions is that, if shocks are not perfectly correlated across 
individuals, transfers contingent on each individual’s shock improve each individual’s 
situation, at least from an ex ante perspective. 
The analysis of such institutions has a long history in development economics dating 
back to Cheung’s (1968) contribution on risk sharing in sharecropping contracts. More 
recently, economists’ interest in this field has grown rapidly. In an empirical investigation, 
Udry (1990) finds that informal credit in rural Nigeria serves as insurance against 
idiosyncratic risks. In a theoretical paper, Coate and Ravallion (1993) characterise optimal 
risk sharing between two households when contractual claims cannot be enforced. In both 
studies, each household head observes not only his own but also his contract partner’s 
income. This assumption may be reasonable in the context of rural villages, where 
information flows freely. In urban settings, where income is generated mostly outside the 
residential neighbourhood (or slum), individuals may only observe their own incomes. 
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Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) allow private information on incomes but exclude any 
enforcement problems. They find that, in a two-period world, a market for consumption credit 
facilitates higher investment than autarky because individuals can smooth their consumption 
streams by lending and borrowing instead of putting money aside unproductively. 
In a multi-period world, the analysis of risk sharing with private information becomes 
rather complicated. Green (1987), Phelan and Townsend (1990), and Atkeson and Lucas 
(1992) consider a principal and one or many risk averse agents and characterise incentive-
compatible allocations. ‘Incentive-compatible’ in this context means that, for each agent, 
reporting the realisation of his income truthfully, constitutes a Nash equilibrium. In all of 
these papers, there is neither individual borrowing nor saving and aggregate consumption 
does not need to equal aggregate income. In Wang (1995), in contrast, there is no principal 
and an aggregate budget-balancing constraint is imposed. He analyses the constrained 
efficient, incentive-compatible insurance contract among two infinitely lived, ex-ante 
identical agents when incomes are privately observed and enforcement problems are absent. 
There are very few papers addressing the performance of existing nonmarket 
institutions in developing countries when incomes are privately observed. The reason for this 
is likely that the mainstream of micro-development economics has focused on the theory of 
contracts and institutions in the agricultural sector and, as argued above, within a village, 
information on individual states is often public knowledge. An exception is Udry (1994), who 
also considers idiosyncratic income shocks which are privately observed. 
In the empirical literature on Roscas, it has been argued for a long time that, when 
participants are exposed to risk, Roscas can serve as a risk-sharing mechanism. In the context 
of Roscas without a bidding allocation mechanism, this has first been suggested by Ardener 
(1964), who observed that, in Roscas with a predetermined order of receipt of the pot, the 
order may be changed in favour of a participant who suffers some unforeseen liquidity crisis 
  
13 
in the course of the Rosca. Of course, this mechanism only works when the said liquidity 
crisis is observed by all participants or at least by the organiser. Platteau (1997) interprets 
bidding Roscas as an intertemporal redistribution mechanism, where “the group member who 
accepts the biggest deduction and who is presumably the most hard-pressed by emergency 
needs, receives what remains of the common fund after the agreed deduction is effected” (p. 
785). 
Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) find evidence that the timing and the extent of such 
emergency needs are not known to the participants when they join a Rosca and interpret this 
as evidence against the deterministic Rosca models of Besley et al. (1993, 1994). Calomiris 
and Rajaraman argue that, except for one case1, all of the empirical literature reports Rosca 
arrangements where bidding is concurrent with the allocation of pots. In the approaches taken 
by Besley et al. (1993) and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), however, the auctions for all 
future pots can be staged at the beginning of the Rosca. Another striking difference lies in the 
course of the winning bid from period to period. For an actual Rosca in an Indian city, 
Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) find that winning bids do not decrease steadily from auction 
to auction, which contradicts the predictions of the models of Besley et al. (1993) and 
Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999). Calomiris and Rajaraman conclude that, at least for their 
particular Rosca, deterministic models do not capture the essential features. Instead, they 
stress the role of Roscas as an insurance mechanism by allocating each period’s pot to the 
bidder who has suffered the most severe shock. 
Of course, Roscas cannot effectively insure against aggregate shocks when 
participants belong to an economically and socially homogenous group like small farmers in a 
village whose harvests depend on the weather to a large extent. But even here, as Townsend’s 
                                               
1
 This is Campbell and Ahn (1962) for Korea. 
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(1994) results suggest, a variety of mechanisms appear to be at work in providing substantial 
insurance against idiosyncratic risks like illness or the death of farm animals. We do not claim 
that Roscas never play a role for the accumulation of funds to finance lumpy goods. There is, 
however, a startling imbalance between the number of empirical studies which stress the risk-
sharing aspect of Roscas and the focus of theoretical papers on Roscas, which have 
completely neglected this aspect so far. It is this imbalance which motivates this essay. 
In this essay, we analyse how a bidding Rosca functions under the following 
assumptions, which are set out and discussed in detail in section 1.2. First, participants are 
risk averse and use funds from the Rosca entirely for consumption, each participant’s income 
being stochastic. Second, participants cannot observe other participants’ incomes, but all 
share the same beliefs about the distribution from which the incomes are drawn. By assuming 
such a private information environment, the analysis focuses on urban Roscas among 
homogenous participants who do not observe each other’s incomes, e. g. hawkers and 
shoeshine boys (see Nayar, 1983, and Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998, for examples from 
India). Third, we employ the invariable assumption in the literature on risk sharing (see, 
among many others, Coate and Ravallion, 1993, and Wang, 1995) that transfers of income 
across periods are possible neither through storage nor through borrowing and lending. 
Fourth, the analysis of this chapter is restricted to the case of participation in one single 
bidding Rosca. Section 1.3 investigates what restrictions on preferences are required to induce 
participation in either a random or a bidding Rosca. Section 1.4 looks at the intertemporal 
pattern of observed winning bids. Section 1.5 summarises the findings and offers conclusions. 
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1.2 Risk Sharing and the Functioning of Bidding Roscas under Private 
Information 
It is well known that in the absence of borrowing and savings opportunities, the optimal risk-
sharing contract among n ex ante identical individuals involves pooling all individual incomes 
and allocating one n’th thereof to each individual in each period. Such an arrangement, 
however, requires that, in any period, each individual’s income is public knowledge. While 
this is a reasonable assumption for residents of a small rural village who generate their 
incomes within that village, it is less persuasive in an urban setting, where the income of a 
casual labourer may be exclusively his private knowledge. In such cases, the arrangement just 
outlined collapses, because there is an incentive to underreport one’s income and thus 
contribute less to the income pool. Thus a risk-sharing mechanism under such informational 
constraints must give individuals an incentive to report their incomes truthfully. Specifically, 
in a two-individual-two-period context, such an incentive can be generated by intertemporal 
trade, compensating the individual who is a net payer in the first period with a positive net 
transfer in the second. If the world ends after two periods, then, in the second period, no 
further intertemporal trade can take place. 
Exactly these features can be found in a two-participant-two-period bidding Rosca: 
before the first period, the two participants A and B make an arrangement whereby each pays 
a stipulated amount m into a pot in each period. In the first period, the participants bid for pot 
one. Assuming that half the price paid for this pot, b say, is allocated to each participant, one 
would expect the participant with the higher current need for funds, A say, to win this auction. 
In this context, ‘higher need’ is equivalent to ‘lower first-period income’. Consequently, in 
the first period, A receives a net transfer of m – b/2 from B. According to the rules of the 
Rosca, however, B receives the pot and thus a net transfer of m from A in the second period. 
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This latter transfer can be viewed as the ‘price’ A has to pay for the transfer she received from 
B in the first period. 
To set out the analytical framework, assume that each of the two participants2 
evaluates consumption levels in periods one and two ci1 and ci2, respectively, with a bivariate 
von-Neuman-Morgenstern utility function, u(ci1, ci2), which is strictly increasing and concave 
in each argument, and that, in period t, her income yit3 is drawn from a distribution 
characterised by the smooth distribution function F on the domain I = [yl, yu]. All Yit, 
i, t = 1, 2 are assumed to be independently and identically distributed according to F. Support 
for this assumption comes from the fact that Rosca participants typically belong to the same 
social and professional group (see, e. g., Bouman, 1979). It is further assumed that 
participants have access to neither credit nor savings opportunities outside the Rosca. 
Although the absence of savings opportunities in particular appears to be a very restrictive 
assumption, it is a fact that in many urban settings where Roscas are observed it may be 
dangerous or even impossible to store money. Also, as Anderson and Balland (1999) argue, a 
Rosca may offer a wife the opportunity to withdraw money from her husband's sphere, who 
may have different, likely more short-sighted, ideas about how to use the money. In this 
section it is further assumed that each individual participates in only one Rosca and that the 
contribution to the Rosca each member makes in each period, m say, has been agreed upon 
beforehand and can be considered fixed. 
To avoid technical complications, we assume that participants can always pay their 
                                               
2
 For ease of exposition, I restrict attention to two-period Roscas. 
3
 Throughout this dissertation, random variables are denoted by capital letters, while lower 
case letters denote realisations. 
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contribution m, even if they are hit by the most severe income shock possible. Formally, 
define cmin ≡ yl – m. We require that cmin ≥ 0 and that u x x( , )1 2  be strictly bounded from below 
on the domain Du ≡ {( , ): , }min minx x x c x c1 2 1 2≥ ≥ . 
Any problems of enforceability of contributions to the Rosca by members who have 
received a pot earlier, and are thus left with only obligations, are neglected. This can be 
justified by the fact that defaulting on contributions results in exclusion from future Roscas 
and by assuming that the disutility therefrom is prohibitively high.4 Another important 
empirical feature, the remuneration of the Rosca organiser, is also excluded from this 
analysis. 
In the literature, a variety of arrangements have been observed when it comes to the 
auctioning of the pot. There are various rules determining how the price for a period’s pot is 
used. The most important issue is whether the said price is added to future pots (as in 
Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998), or distributed at once, and if the latter, either among all or 
only among the active participants (as in Radakrishnan et al., 1975).5 Throughout this 
dissertation, we will focus on the latter system, where the price is distributed instantaneously. 
In this chapter we will, moreover, assume that the winning bid is distributed among all Rosca 
participants. 
We will confine our analysis to oral ascending bid (OA) auctions, which are the 
predominantly encountered auction type in actual bidding Roscas. In an OA-Rosca auction, 
                                               
4
 There is sufficient empirical evidence in support of this assumption. See, among others, 
Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998). 
5
 In accordance with the literature, those participants who have not yet received a pot are 
referred to as 'active'. 
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the active participants meet and submit successive oral bids until only one bidder, the winner, 
remains. As in the analysis of standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value 
(SIPV) bidders,6 one may model such an OA-Rosca auction as a button Rosca auction where 
each of the two bidders presses a button in front of her as the standing bid continuously 
increases. The auction is over once one of the two bidders, i say, releases her button. In this 
case, the other bidder, j say, receives the pot at a price equal to the standing bid at the moment 
i dropped out. For the derivation of bidding equilibria in a button Rosca auction, it is useful to 
consider a second-price sealed bid (SPS) Rosca auction. In this auction, both bidders submit 
their bids in sealed envelopes. The highest bid wins and the winner pays a price equal to the 
second highest bid submitted. Although this type of auction is not reported in any of the 
Rosca literature, in the present case, its equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the button Rosca 
auction. In the button Rosca auction, each bidder’s problem is to decide when to release her 
button. Suppose that each bidder releases her button at a standing bid equal to her bid in the 
SPS-Rosca auction. If both bidders follow this rule, the payoffs to both of them are equal in 
the SPS and the button Rosca auction. Moreover, in a button Rosca auction with two bidders, 
the information set of each bidder during the auction is the same as the information set of a 
bidder in a SPS-Rosca auction because, during the course of the button auction, each bidder 
                                               
6
 In a standard SIPV bidder auction, there is one seller who owns a single, indivisible item 
and K buyers. Each bidder knows K and his own valuation (or value, in short) for the item, 
which is the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for the item, but none of the 
other bidders’ values. The values are identically and independently distributed (see 
Matthews, 1990). It is further assumed that the seller cannot set a minimum price. 
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only observes whether the auction is still going on or not.7 In the language of game theory, the 
reduced normal form games corresponding to the second-price sealed bid and the oral 
ascending bid Rosca auction are identical. Thus they are strategically equivalent, which 
implies that the equilibrium of the SPS-Rosca auction is also an equilibrium of the OA-Rosca 
auction.8 
With this in hand, we can now embark on the strategic analysis of OA-Rosca auctions. 
As a first step, it is useful to introduce the concept of the maximum willingness to pay for 
period one’s pot. After a participant, i say, has observed her first-period income, y say, and if 
she receives pot one at price b, her consumption in the first period is given by 
y - m + (2m - b + b/2) = y + m – b/2, where y - m is her first-period income minus her 
contribution to the Rosca and (2m – b + b/2) is the pot she receives minus the price b, plus the 
half of this price that is redistributed to her according to the rules of the Rosca. In this case, i’s 
second-period consumption is y2 – m, where y2 denotes the realisation of her second-period 
income. Accordingly, her expected utility after observing y is uwin(b, y) 
≡ ~( / , )u y m b Y m+ − −2 , where Y denotes the random variable corresponding to y2 and 
~u (⋅, X) ≡ EX[u(⋅, X)] = u x dF x
y
y
l
u ( , ) ( )⋅ . If, on the other hand, the other participant receives pot 
one at price b, i’s expected utility is given by ulose(b, y) ≡ ~( / , )u y m b Y m− + +2 . 
                                               
7
 A discussion of button Rosca auctions with more than two bidders can be found in 
section 2.3. 
8
 This reasoning is similar to the argument which establishes strategic equivalence of first-
price sealed bid and Dutch auctions for standard SIPV bidder auctions. See, e.g., 
Matthews, 1990. 
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Now consider an OA-Rosca auction where the standing bid b is raised subsequently. 
At low levels of b, a bidder with first-period income y prefers winning pot one to losing it, 
formally uwin(b, y) > ulose(b, y) for sufficiently small b. Given the definition of u(⋅,⋅), however, 
the said bidder’s preference over winning or losing pot one is reversed at sufficiently high 
levels of the standing bid, formally uwin(b, y) < ulose(b, y) for sufficiently large b. We define 
the maximum willingness to pay for pot one, b0 say, as that level of the standing bid at which 
a bidder is indifferent between winning and losing pot one. Formally, b0(y) is the value of b 
that satisfies 
( 1 )  ~( / , ) ~( / , )u y m b Y m u y m b Y m− + + = + − −2 2 . 
It is now argued that b0 corresponds to a bidder’s value in a standard (not a Rosca) 
auction with SIPV bidders. In such auctions, by definition, a bidder is indifferent between 
winning and not winning the item auctioned when she has to pay a price equal to her true 
value. This definition applies to b0(y) in the present case; for by ( 1 ), a bidder with first-
period income y is indifferent between receiving pot one and not receiving it at a level of the 
standing bid equal to b0(y). 
In what follows, it will be assumed that the participant with the more severe income 
shock in period one has a higher maximum willingness to pay for pot one: 
 
 Assumption 1: b0 is strictly decreasing in period-one income, formally 
( 2 ) db y
dy
0 ( )
 
= 2 
~ ( ( ) / , ) ~ ( ( ) / , )
~ ( ( ) / , ) ~ ( ( ) / , )
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
2 2
2 2
+ − − − − + +
+ − − + − + +  < 0 for all y. 
 
We now derive a symmetric Bayes-Nash bidding equilibrium of a SPS-Rosca auction, which 
is also a symmetric equilibrium of an OA-Rosca auction, as has been argued above. Towards 
this end, assume that i conjectures that j determines her bid bj according to a smooth, strictly 
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decreasing function b(yj), where yj denotes j’s first-period income. Because of the private 
information assumption, for i, j’s first-period income is a random variable distributed 
according to F. Therefore, from i’s perspective, the probability of losing the auction 
conditional on bidding bi is P(bi < b(Yj)) = P(b-1(bi) > Yj) = F(b-1(bi)), where the events 
bi < b(Yj) and b-1(bi) > Yj are identical by virtue of the assumption that b(⋅) is a strictly 
decreasing function. The probability that i loses is, by definition, 1 - P(bi < b(Yj)) 
= 1 - F(b-1(bi)). 
If i loses the auction, her expected utility conditional on her first-period income yi and 
her bid bi is ~( / , )u y m b Y mi i− + +2 . If, on the other hand, i wins the auction, her expected 
utility conditional on yi and bi is E u y m b Y Y m Y b bi j j i[~( ( ) / , )| ( )]+ − − > −2 1 . Consequently, i’s 
interim expected utility9 as a function of her bid bi is given by 
 E[U(bi)| yi] ≡ ~( / , )u y m b Y mi i− + +2 F(b-1(bi))      
( 3 ) 
     + E u y m b Y Y m Y b bi j j i[~( ( ) / , )| ( )]+ − − > −2 1 (1 - F(b-1(bi))), 
and i’s task is to maximise E[U(bi)| yi] by choice of bi. The corresponding first-order 
condition reads 
 
∂
∂
= − + + −
E U b y
b
u y m b Y m F b bi i
i
i i i
[ ( )| ]
~ / , ( ( ))1
2
21
1   
( 4 ) 
  + ~ / , ~ / , ( ( ))( ( ))u y m b Y m u y m b Y m
f b b
b b bi i i i
i
i
− + + − + − −
′
−
−
2 2
1
1      = 0. 
                                               
9
 In accordance with the literature on SIPV auctions, at the interim stage, a bidder has 
observed her type (in the present case determined by yi) but not yet submitted her bid. 
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The Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, bs(⋅) say, is obtained by substituting b(yi) for bi 
in the RHS of ( 4 ), where the subscript s indicates that bs(⋅) characterises an equilibrium of a 
SPS- and thus of an OA-Rosca auction. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a two-participant-two-period bidding Rosca with an oral ascending 
bid auction, in which assumption 1 holds. Then 
(i) in a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each bidder quits the auction at a standing bid 
equal to bs(y), where y is a bidder’s privately observed first-period income and 
( 5 )  bs´(y) = 2 2 221
f y
F y
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m
u y m b y Y m
s s
s
( )
( )
~( ( ) / , ) ~( ( ) / , )
~ ( ( ) / , )
+ − − − − + +
− + +


	


, 
( 6 )  bs(yl) = b0(yl); 
(ii) in such an equilibrium, bidders overbid relative to their maximum willingness to pay, i.e. 
bs(y) > b0(y) for all y > yl; 
(iii) bids are strictly decreasing in income, i.e. bs´(y) < 0 for all y. 
 
Proof: 
(i) Necessity follows from ( 4 ).         
(ii) By applying L’Hôpital’s rule to the RHS of ( 5 ) in view of the fact that yl constitutes a 
singularity for the differential equation ( 5 ), we obtain 
( 7 ) bs´(yl) = 2 2 22 2 2
1
0 0
1
0
1
0
~ ( ( ) / , ) ~( ( ) / , )
~ ( ( ) / , ) ~ ( ( ) / , )
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m
l l l l
l l l l
+ − − − − + +
+ − − + − + +
, 
where, according to ( 6 ), b0(yl) has been substituted for bs(yl). Comparing ( 2 ) with ( 7 ), it 
follows that 
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( 8 ) 0 > bs´(yl) > b0´(yl). 
Combining ( 8 ) with ( 6 ), we obtain 
Lemma 1: There exists an ε > 0 such that bs(y) > b0(y) for all yl < y ≤ yl + ε. 
Now assume that 
( 9 ) bs(y0) = b0(y0) for some y0 > yl. 
By ( 1 ) and ( 5 ), ( 9 ) implies that 
( 10 ) bs´(y0) = 0. 
By assumption 1, however, 
( 11 ) b0´(y0) < 0. 
Hence, for any y0 > yl, bs intersects b0 from below, which contradicts Lemma 1. Thus, 
( 12 ) bs and b0 cannot intersect for any y > yl. 
Moreover, by combining ( 10 ) and ( 11 ), we find that ( 9 ) implies that bs´(y0) > b0´(y0) and 
hence 
( 13 ) bs cannot touch b0 for any y > yl.  
Combining ( 12 ) and ( 13 ) with Lemma 1 gives the desired result.     
(iii) Since, by virtue of (ii), bs(y) > b0(y) for all y > yl, it follows from ( 1 ) and the fact that u is 
strictly increasing in its first argument that the RHS of ( 5 ) is negative. Together with the first 
inequality in ( 8 ), this gives the desired result.       
QED 
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Sufficient conditions for the existence of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium characterised in 
Proposition 1 are given in section 1.6.1 of the Appendix to this chapter. 
The result that, in an OA-Rosca auction, bidders overbid relative to their maximum 
willingness to pay is in marked contrast to equilibrium behaviour in a standard SIPV oral 
English auction, where bidding one’s true value is a dominant strategy. As argued above, the 
analogue to a bidder’s value in a standard SIPV auction is b0(y) in a Rosca auction. Suppose 
participant i originally intends to quit the auction at a standing bid equal to b0(yi) and the other 
participant, j say, is also still in the auction at b0(yi). By staying in the auction up to b0(yi) + ε 
instead of b0(yi), i takes the chance of winning the pot at a price at which she prefers not to 
win the pot, because, by definition, ulose(b0(yi) + ε, yi) > uwin(b0(yi) + ε,  yi). This happens 
whenever j quits the bidding process before b0(yi) + ε. On the other hand, staying in the 
auction up to b0(yi) + ε instead of b0(yi) improves i’s situation whenever j does not quit the 
bidding process at a standing bid lower than b0(yi) + ε because now i receives (b0(yi) + ε)/2 
instead of b0(yi)/2 as her share of the price j pays for the pot. In a standard SIPV auction, only 
the former of these two effects is present and therefore, in such auctions, there is no gain from 
overbidding. Proposition 1, however, shows that, in the equilibrium of a Rosca auction, the 
gains from overbidding exceed the losses except for a bidder with income yl, who wins the pot 
with probability one. Thus bs(yl) = b0(yl). 
The lesson from this is that, contrary to standard SIPV bidder oral English auctions, 
bidding in a Rosca auction is always strategic and equilibria in dominant strategies fail to 
exist. The reason for this arises from the fact that, in the terminology of Kovsted and Lyk-
Jensen (1999), in a Rosca auction, the seller is internalised in the group of bidders. As a 
consequence, the loser of a Rosca auction is not left in the same economic situation as before 
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the beginning of the auction, but rather receives a gain from the share of the winning bid that 
is allocated to him.10 
1.3 Preferences for Risk Bearing and Preferences for Random and Bidding 
Roscas 
With the results of the previous section in hand, we can now ask: how do preferences for risk 
bearing influence the decision to participate in a random or a bidding Rosca? We shall make 
use of the concept of temporal risk aversion, which was first defined by Richard (1975) as 
follows: a decision maker is said to be multivariate risk averse if, for any pair (x, y), 
u12(x, y) < 0 and multivariate risk seeking if u12(x, y) > 0. The case of u12(x, y) = 0 is defined 
as multivariate risk neutrality. If u’s arguments refer to consumption at two points in time, 
‘multivariate’ may be replaced by ‘temporal’ (see Ingersoll, 1987). This concept can be 
illustrated as follows: Consider two lotteries L1 and L2 which are both resolved in period zero. 
L1 involves a consumption level of x in both the first and the second period with probability 
0.5 and a consumption level of y in both periods with probability 0.5. L2 involves a 
consumption level of x in the first and y in the second period with probability 0.5, and y in the 
first and x in the second period with probability 0.5. A temporal risk averse decision maker 
prefers L2 to L1, while a temporal risk seeking decision maker prefers L1 to L2 for any pair 
(x, y). Thus, loosely speaking, a temporal risk seeking agent has a preference for lotteries 
                                               
10
 Roscas share this feature with so called fair division games, which are auctions where the 
price the winner pays is distributed to the other bidders. Such games with risk averse 
bidders, however, have not yet been studied. See Güth et al. (1999a) for an experimental 
application and Güth and van Damme (1986) for a theoretical analysis. 
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whose payoffs are positively correlated over time while a temporal risk averse agent prefers 
negatively correlated payoffs.11 
We begin with a random Rosca. While uncorrelated without such a Rosca, the 
consumption levels of participants in a random Rosca are negatively correlated. We write the 
interim expected utility of a participant with first-period income y as 
( 14 ) E[UR| y] ≡ ~( , ) ~( , ) /u y m Y m u y m Y m+ − + − +  2 . 
For the sake of analytical tractability, we concentrate on Roscas with an infinitesimally small 
contribution m. Evaluating the derivative of ( 14 ) w.r.t. m at m = 0 yields zero, while the 
second derivative is 
( 15 ) d E U y
dm
u y Y u y Y u y Y
R
m
2
2
0
11 22 122 2
[ | ]
~ ( , ) ~ ( , ) ~ ( , )
| =
= + −  . 
It is seen that, if u12 ≥ 0, the said derivative is strictly negative. Thus, not participating in a 
random Rosca is the optimal decision for temporal risk seeking and temporal risk neutral 
agents. A simple continuity argument, moreover, establishes at once the result that agents who 
are sufficiently mildly temporal risk averse will not participate either. In general, however, if 
u12 < 0, the case is ambiguous. The question then is whether the effect of temporal risk 
aversion arising from the negative cross derivative outweighs the effect of static risk aversion 
arising from the concavity of u in each argument. Formally, similar to Ronn (1988), define the 
coefficients of static and temporal risk aversion as 
                                               
11
 Ronn (1988) argues that for a temporal risk averse agent, consumption levels in any two 
periods are ‘substitutes through time’, whereas they are complements for a temporal risk 
seeker. 
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RAt(x1,X2) ≡ −
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
u x X
u x X
tt
t
1 2
1 2
 and TRAkt(x1,X2) ≡ −
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
u x X
u x X
kt
t
1 2
1 2
, 
respectively, and rewrite ( 15 ) as 
    
d E U y
dm
u y Y TRA y Y RA y Y u y Y TRA y Y RA y Y
R
m
2
2
0
1 21 1 2 12 22
[ | ]
~ ( , )( ( , ) ( , )) ~ ( , )( ( , ) ( , ))
| =
= − + −  . 
Defining autarky as not participating in a Rosca, we have 
 
Proposition 2:  If 
( 16 ) TRA21(y, Y) ≤ RA1(y, Y) and TRA12(y, Y) ≤ RA2(y, Y) for all y, 
then autarky is preferred to participation in a random Rosca with a small contribution m. 
 
A borderline case arises when u(x1, x2) = v(x1 + x2) for some strictly increasing and 
concave function v.12 Then TRAtk = RAt = RAk and such individuals are indifferent between 
participating in a random Rosca or not. Although a certain degree of temporal risk aversion 
seems plausible for individuals whose consumption is not well above the subsistence level, it 
is rather unlikely that any such individual would improve her situation by joining a random 
Rosca.13 
                                               
12
 If v(x) = x, this is the case of risk neutral agents who do not discount future consumption. 
13
 Only few studies have addressed the relationship between static and temporal risk aversion 
empirically, none of them in the context of developing countries. In a data set of US 
consumers, however, Epstein and Zin (1991) find a statistically significant positive 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which, in their framework, implies that static risk 
aversion is more pronounced than temporal risk aversion. 
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Turning to bidding Roscas, interim expected utility in equilibrium E[U| y] is obtained 
by substituting bs(⋅) for b(⋅) and bs(yi) for bi in ( 3 ). Further, for notational convenience, we 
drop the subscript i. 
( 17 ) E[U| y] ≡ ~( ( ) / , )u y m b y Y ms− + +2 F(y) + E u y m b Y Y m Y ys j j[~( ( ) / , )| ]+ − − >2 (1-F(y)). 
The following proposition is based on the expression dE U y
dm
[ | ]
 evaluated at m = 0. We thus 
ask, as for random Roscas, how participation in a small bidding Rosca changes interim 
expected utility with autarky as the reference point. 
 
Proposition 3: 
At the interim stage, two individuals will choose to form a bidding Rosca that results in pot 
one going to the participant with lower first-period income if, and only if, 
( 18 )  RA y Y TRA y Y1 12( , ) ( , )≥  for all y and 
( 19 ) there exists an ε > 0 such that RA y Y TRA y Y1 12( , ) ( , )>  for all yl < y < yl + ε. 
 
Proof (Sketch): 
A Sufficiency 
Sufficiency requires two things: 
(i) For an infinitesimally small bidding Rosca, there exists an equilibrium bidding 
function bs(y) which is strictly decreasing in first-period income y, because only a 
strictly decreasing bs(⋅) ensures that pot one always goes to the participant with lower 
first-period income. 
(ii) For all y, E[U| y] is increasing in m at m = 0. 
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Proof of (i): 
It is easily verified that b ys m( )| =0 , and thus b ys m′ =( )| 0 , is equal to zero for all y. It is, moreover, 
established in section 1.6.2.1 of the Appendix to this chapter that 
( 20 ) ∂ ′
∂ =
b y
m
s
m
( )
| 0
= − −4 3 2
1
1 12
2f y
F y
u Y
u Y
RA Y TRA Y F d
y
y
l
( )
( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) 
  ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ . 
By L’Hôpital’s rule, ∂ ′
∂ =
b y
m
s l
m
( )
| 0
 is always zero, whereas, if ( 18 ) and ( 19 ) hold, the RHS of 
( 20 ) is strictly negative for all y > yl, which implies that, for small m, bs(y) is strictly 
decreasing for all y. 
To verify that bidding according to bs(y) is a best response, section 1.6.2.2 of the 
Appendix to this chapter establishes that, for all y, ( 18 ) is sufficient for the pseudoconcavity 
of ∂
∂ =
E U b y
m
s
m
[ ( )| ]
| 0
 in b, where E[Us(b)| y] is equal to E[U(b)| y] as defined in ( 3 ) with bs(⋅) 
substituted for b(⋅).           
Proof of (ii): 
Given (i), it is established in section 1.6.2.3 of the Appendix to this chapter that 
( 21 ) ∂
∂ =
E U y
m m
[ | ]
| 0
 = 
~ ( , )u y Y1  
*
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
u Y
u Y
RA Y TRA Y F d u Y
u Y
RA Y TRA Y F d
y
y
y
yu
l
2
1
1 12
2 2
1
1 12
21ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ− − + −



       , 
which is clearly positive for all y if ( 18 ) and ( 19 ) hold.      
B Necessity 
(i) Necessity of ( 18 ): Assume that 
( 22 ) RA y Y TRA y Y1 12( , ) ( , )′ < ′  for some y´. 
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It is established in section 1.6.2.4 of the Appendix to this chapter that ( 22 ) implies that, 
evaluated at b = bs(y´), ∂ ′∂ =
E U b y
m
s
m
[ ( )| ]
| 0
 is strictly convex in b. Thus 
bs(y´) ≠ arg max
b
E[Us(b)| y´] for small values of m and so the strictly decreasing function bs(⋅) 
is not an equilibrium bidding function, which contradicts the statement ‘two individuals will 
choose to form a bidding Rosca that results in pot one going to the participant with lower 
first-period income’.          
(ii) Necessity of ( 19 ): Assume that there exists no ε > 0 such that 
RA y Y TRA y Y1 12( , ) ( , )>  for all yl < y < yl + ε. Then it follows from ( 20 ) that in some 
neighbourhood of yl, 
∂ ′
∂ =
b y
m
s
m
( )
| 0
≥ 0, which violates the requirement that bs(⋅) be strictly 
decreasing for all y.           
 QED 
 
 It can be shown that, for preferences whose coefficient of temporal risk aversion is 
uniformly higher than the coefficient of static first-period risk aversion, participation in a 
bidding Rosca with a strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function is advantageous. All of 
the qualitative empirical evidence (see, e.g., Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998), however, 
suggests that such bidding behaviour does not occur in reality and is therefore not discussed 
further in this chapter. A particularly important specification of intertemporal utility involves 
additive separability of the utility contributions from the first and second period, u(x1, x2) 
= v1(x1) + v2(x2), with vt´ > 0 and vt´´ < 0, t = 1, 2. For all such utility functions, u12 = 0 and 
thus, within the present framework, additively separable utility functions induce participation 
exclusively in bidding Roscas. 
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Empirically, participation in both random and bidding Roscas is observed among ex 
ante identical individuals. This contradicts both (i) the present result that, when individuals 
are exposed to risk and reasonable assumptions on preferences, namely ( 16 ), are imposed, 
only participation in bidding Roscas occurs, and (ii) the predictions of deterministic Rosca 
models (Besley et al., 1993; Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen, 1999), where, when there is no income 
risk and individuals desire to purchase a lumpy good, only participation in random Roscas 
occurs. In practice, however, decision-makers are simultaneously affected by the two factors, 
which are separately analysed in the present stochastic Rosca model and the deterministic 
Rosca models. Thus a plausible interpretation of the coexistence of bidding and random 
Roscas among ex ante identical individuals is that, for those who join a random Rosca, the 
advantages of the latter arrangement for facilitating an earlier purchase of a lumpy good 
override the desire to insure, while the insurance motive is stronger when participation in a 
bidding Rosca occurs. 
 To conclude this section, a remark on the optimal value of m, m* say, in the case of a 
bidding Rosca is in order. Since, in reality, a Rosca is planned before the first meeting, the 
appropriate perspective is the ex ante stage, where participants have not yet observed their 
first-period incomes. Formally, their problem is to maximise ex ante expected utility E[U] 
≡ EY1 [E[U| Y1]] by choice of m, where expected utility for the realisation y1, E[U| y1], is given 
by ( 17 ). Since this problem has no explicit solution, we consider a numerical example where 
u(x1, x2) = log(x1) + δ log(x2) and income within each period is uniformly distributed on the 
interval [1, 2]. If there is no discounting, i.e. δ = 1, the optimum contribution is 0.083. For 
strong discounting, that is δ = 0.5, the corresponding value is 0.109. Thus, about six to eight 
percent of the expected income is contributed to the Rosca in each period. 
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1.4 The Rate of Time Preference and the Intertemporal Pattern of Bids 
In empirical studies, it is observed that winning bids exhibit a decreasing trend from period to 
period. For a specific family of utility functions, we now explore how risk aversion and the 
individual rate of time preference affect the intertemporal pattern of bids and observed prices. 
This has important implications for empirical research, since, in most studies, the latter is the 
only statistic available. Since a two-period Rosca involves only one auction, an appropriate 
framework for this section is a three-period Rosca. As before, it is assumed that each of the 
three participants contributes m to each period’s pot, which consequently now amounts to 3m. 
Since the winning bid is distributed among three participants, each receives a third of it. To 
keep the analysis tractable, we restrict our attention to income shocks distributed uniformly on 
the unit interval (i.e. F(y) = y, yl = 0, yu = 1) and the family of CARA utility functions with 
temporal risk aversion equal to zero: 
( 23 ) u(c1, c2, c3) ≡ v(c1) + δ v(c2) + δ 2 v(c3) with v(y) ≡ -(exp[-ay] – 1)/a, a > 0, 0 < δ ≤ 1. 14 
Define bt(yt), t = 1, 2, to be the standing bid at which an active bidder with period t income yt 
intends to quit the period t auction. It can be shown that, in a symmetric equilibrium, bt(⋅) 
satisfies 
( 24 ) db
dy
y f y
F y
v y m b y v y m b y
v y m b y
t
t
t
t
t
t t t t t t t
t t t
( ) ( )( )
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( ))
=
+ − − − + +
′ − +








3
2 2
3
1
3
1
3
δ ∆
 and 
                                               
14
 The familiar result that, for the family of CARA utility functions, individual decisions are 
independent of the level of the income variable, is also applicable in the present case. Thus 
the analysis of this section remains unchanged for any shift of the income random variable. 
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( 25 ) v y m b y v y m b yl t l l t l t( ( )) ( ( ))+ − − − + =2
2
3
1
3
δ ∆  with 
( 26 ) ∆1 ≡ E[U1L - U1W] 
∆2 ≡ E[v(Y + 2m) – v(Y – m)]. 
E[U1W] is defined as the expected future utility (i.e. the utility contributions of the payoffs in 
the second and third period) of the winner of the first pot before observing her second-period 
income, while E[U1L] is the expected future utility of a first-period ‘loser’ before observing 
her second-period income. Analogously, ∆2 is the difference between the expected future 
utility (i.e. the utility contributions of the payoffs in the third period) of the ‘loser’ of both the 
first and second auction and the winner of the second pot, before observing y3. Thus ∆t can be 
interpreted as the (undiscounted) future utility costs of winning pot t. The next proposition 
concerns the relationship between the degree of impatience and the bids submitted. 
 
Proposition 4:  db y
d
t t( )
δ
< 0  for all admissible values of a, δ, m, t and yt. 
 
Proof: See section 1.6.3 of the Appendix to this chapter. 
 
The higher her degree of impatience, the less a participant cares about the future costs 
of winning an early pot, and thus, for any realised first or second-period income, the higher 
the bid she submits. An interesting case arises whenever a and δ are such that ∆1 = ∆2. Then, 
by ( 24 ) and ( 25 ), b1(y) = b2(y) for all y. 
 
  
34 
δ
b1 > b2
b1 < b2
a
 
Figure 1. The intertemporal discount factor, δ, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, a, and 
bids in period one and two for a three-period Rosca with contribution 0.1 
 
The concave line in Figure 1 is the locus of pairs (δ, a) that yield identical future utility costs 
of winning in the first or second period. Since an increase in δ increases ∆1 and leaves ∆2 
constant, it is easily established that a departure from the separating locus to the right affects 
b1 more strongly than b2 and thus, for any given income y, yields b2(y) > b1(y). Concerning a, 
we did not succeed in establishing analytically what Figure 1 reveals, namely that an upward 
departure from the separating locus (i.e. an increase in the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, a) affects first-period bids more strongly than second-period bids. There is, 
however, an intuitive explanation for this. First note that the future utility costs of pot one can 
be decomposed into a contribution from the second period, ∆12, and a contribution from the 
third period, which equals the future utility costs of pot two multiplied by half the discount 
factor δ: 
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( 27 ) ∆1 = ∆12 + (δ/2) ∆2.15 
On the separating locus, we thus have ∆12 = (1-(δ/2))∆2. Since the second pot is allocated to 
that active participant who suffers the bigger income shock in the second period, ∆12 involves 
transfers that go, at least partly, from the better to the worse off participant, whereas, for the 
third period, ∆2 involves transfers that are independent of that period’s incomes. 
Consequently, increasing a from a level where an individual is indifferent between ∆12 and 
(1-(δ/2))∆2 should yield a preference for ∆12 and thus a lower value of ∆12 than (1-(δ/2))∆2 
because, as mentioned, the ∆’s have the character of utility costs. In summary, we expect that, 
when ∆1 = ∆2, 
d
da
d
da
∆ ∆1 2< . Finally, it is easily verified that d
da
∆2
 is strictly negative and that 
db y
d
t
t
( )
∆
 is strictly negative for all y. Hence we obtain the desired result that, when 
b1(y) = b2(y) for all y, db yda
db y
da
1 2( ) ( )>  for all y. 
 Turning to the observed prices which each period’s winner pays, first note that, even 
in the case where first and second-period bidding strategies are identical, on average, the 
winner of the first pot pays more than the winner of the second pot because the number of 
active participants and thereby the auction’s competitiveness decreases. Instead of comparing 
the expected values of the observed prices directly, we focus on a related statistic that 
facilitates an intuitive interpretation of the effects of both risk aversion and the rate of time 
preference. As a benchmark, consider a three-period bidding Rosca with risk neutral 
participants with utility function u as given by ( 23 ) with a = 0. Since, in this case, income 
uncertainty does not affect bidding, a bidding equilibrium is uniquely defined by that pair 
                                               
15
 See section 1.6.3 of the Appendix to this chapter for explicit formulae. 
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(b1, b2) which, in each period, equalises the winner’s and the losers’ expected utilities. This 
yields 
( 28 ) bt = 3 1 3m t t− −δ  , t = 1, 2, 
where, in the risk-neutral case, δt in ( 28 ) is equal to δ from ( 23 ) for t = 1, 2. Now, for any 
observed bt, the statistic we consider is ρ(bt) ≡ (1/δt) - 1, which can be interpreted as the rate 
of discount implicit in the observed price bt. In the risk-neutral case, this quantity is, of 
course, equal to the rate of time preference. Since bids become income-dependent once risk 
aversion enters the stage, we substitute the expected value E[Bt] for bt and thus obtain 
 rt ≡ ρ(E[Bt]) = 1 3 1
2
−



 −
−E B
m
t
t[ ] /
. 
Figure 2 depicts r1 as a function of the rate of time preference i ≡ (1/δ) – 1 for different 
values of a. As a consequence of Proposition 4, r1 is increasing in i. Note that, for a equal to 
unity, on average, the discount rate implicit in b1 is incidentally just about equal to the rate of 
time preference. Turning to a, it is in line with standard SIPV auctions, that ceteris paribus 
more risk averse individuals bid more aggressively and thus generate a higher rate of discount 
r1. In contrast to standard SIPV auctions, however, this result does not hold uniformly in the 
sense that db y
da
1 1( )
 ≥ 0 for all y1. In fact the slope of b1(y1) is becoming steeper as a increases, 
and for large values of a (1.9 and bigger), we find that db y
da
u1 0( ) < . The reason for this are 
two effects pulling in opposite directions: on the one hand, higher risk aversion increases the 
desire to compensate a contemporaneous (i.e. first-period) income shock by winning pot one 
and thereby stimulates higher bids particularly for low values of y1. On the other hand, 
winning pot one leaves no potential for the compensation of a shock in the two remaining 
periods. As risk aversion increases, an individual values the possibility of compensating a 
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future income shock higher, which in turn lowers the willingness to pay for pot one, 
especially at high levels of y1. 
 
r1
i
 
 	
    	 	
    	 	
   
Figure 2. The rate of time preference, i, and the rate of discount implicit in b1, r1, in a three-
period Rosca with contribution 0.1 for different degrees of risk aversion, a. 
 
 
 Turning to the intertemporal pattern of observed prices, it is of particular interest how 
risk aversion affects the time path of rt. As follows from the derivation above, rt remains 
constant over time if participants are risk-neutral because, by definition, rt does compensate 
for a positive rate of time preference. As Figure 3 illustrates, there is an interesting interaction 
between impatience and the degree of risk aversion. For sufficiently high levels of absolute 
risk aversion, r2 is smaller than r1 while this relationship is reversed at low levels of risk 
aversion. In both cases, higher impatience ceteris paribus increases the difference between r1 
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and r2. Here, again, the arguments apply which have been advanced for explaining Figure 2: 
the future utility costs for winning pot two, ∆2, involve payoffs independent of third-period 
incomes, whereas the future utility costs for winning pot one, ∆1, include the term ∆12, which 
involves transfers that do depend on incomes in the second period. Thus, as a increases, the 
future utility costs for winning the second pot increase relative to those for the first pot and so 
relatively higher contemporaneous costs in the form of r are observed in the first period. This 
effect is more pronounced the higher the rate of time preference, because, as i increases, the 
weight of the third-period component ∆2 in ( 27 ) declines and so the effect of income-
dependent transfers implicit in ∆12 becomes relatively stronger.  
 
i
 
Figure 3. Difference between the rates of discount implicit in the pots’ prices as a function of 
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, a, for different values of the rate of time 
preference, i, in a three-period Rosca with contribution 0.1 
 
  
39 
 In their sample Rosca, Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) find a declining trend in the 
statistic rt. They do not, however, consider the role of risk aversion in this context. As their 
participants are urban casual labourers who earn incomes close to the subsistence level, the 
authors argue that risk aversion can be expected to be fairly pronounced. These findings 
support our model since a decreasing trend in rt is only supported by levels of risk aversion 
above a certain threshold. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
Roscas can offer insurance for homogenous, risk averse individuals who have stochastic, 
privately observed incomes and no access to credit. It has been established that, under the 
assumptions set out above, participation in a single bidding Rosca is advantageous for a wide 
class of preferences, namely, when temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk 
aversion. Under this assumption, participation in a random Rosca does not occur. Roscas 
impose severe restrictions on the set of feasible allocations among participants within each 
period, which arise from a fixed transfer in the last period and the strategic behaviour of 
bidders in prior periods. By doing this, however, they bring about a net transfer from the 
better to the worse off bidder each time a pot is auctioned and thereby overcome information 
asymmetries. 
The present results suggest that, if reasonable restrictions on preferences are imposed, 
homogenous individuals prefer a bidding Rosca because it can allocate funds to the 
participant with the most urgent current need. This finding is supported by empirical studies 
where bidding Roscas are observed among ex ante identical individuals. On the other hand, 
our results cannot explain the existence of random Roscas among ex ante identical 
individuals. For empirical work this suggests that, in the latter case, participation occurs to 
facilitate the earlier purchase of a lumpy good, as argued by Besley et al. (1993) and Kovsted 
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and Lyk-Jensen (1999). They prove that, for a group of homogenous individuals, a random 
Rosca is always preferred, and that bidding Roscas are only preferred when individuals are 
sufficiently heterogeneous. In their setting, heterogeneity is a permanent individual 
characteristic and bidding serves to accommodate those with the highest willingness to pay 
first, which in turn generates a gain for the other members through the distribution of the 
winning bid. In the models presented in this chapter, in contrast, individuals are identical ex 
ante and it is individual-specific uncertainty that generates potential gains from intertemporal 
trade. 
The transactions observed in many actual Roscas are better explained by the present 
approach, where, in contrast to deterministic Rosca models, the price paid for a period’s pot 
does not decrease monotonically with the number of rounds played, although, on average, 
observed transfers to recipients of pots increase if there is a sufficiently high rate of time 
preference. Moreover, if risk aversion is high, the time path of the rate of discount implicit in 
a pot’s price is decreasing on average. The realisations of both of these quantities, however, 
fluctuate significantly in the model presented here. 
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1.6 Appendix to Chapter 1 
1.6.1 Supplement to the Proof of Proposition 1 
This appendix discusses sufficient conditions for the optimality of bidding bs(y) as defined by 
( 5 ) and ( 6 ), given that the other participant bids according to bs(⋅). Towards this end, we 
substitute bs(⋅) for b(⋅) and bs(ψ) for b in E[U(b)| y] as defined by ( 3 ) to obtain 
( 29 ) E[U| y, ψ] ≡ ~( ( ) / , )u y m b Y ms− + +ψ 2 F(ψ) + E u y m b Y Y m Ys j j[~( ( ) / , )| ]+ − − >2 ψ (1-F(ψ)), 
which is the equilibrium interim expected utility of a participant who actually observes first-
period income y but acts in the auction as if his first-period income was ψ instead. Note that, 
by the necessary conditions ( 5 ) and ( 6 ), bs(⋅) is such that ∂ ∂ =
=
E U y
y
[ | , ]
|
ψ
ψ ψ
0  for all y. 
Consequently, as in the analysis of standard SIPV auctions, pseudoconcavity of E[U| y, ψ] in 
ψ for all y is sufficient for the optimality of bidding bs(y), given that the other participant bids 
according to bs(⋅). Formally, the said pseudoconcavity requires that 
( 30 ) ∂ ∂ ≥
E U y[ | , ]ψ
ψ
0
 for all ψ < y and ∂ ∂
≤
E U y[ | , ]ψ
ψ
0
 for all ψ > y. 
For notational convenience, we define 
( 31 ) ∆(y) ≡ m – bs(y)/2. 
Differentiating E[U| y, ψ] as defined in ( 29 ) w.r.t ψ gives 
 
∂
∂
E U y[ | , ]ψ
ψ
= f(ψ) ~ ( ( ), )u y Y m1 − +∆ ψ g(ψ, y) with 
g(ψ, y) ≡ 
~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
u y Y m u y Y m
u y Y m
u Y m u Y m
u Y m
− + − + −
− +
−
− + − + −
− +
∆ ∆
∆
∆ ∆
∆
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ ψ ψ ψ
ψ ψ1 1
, 
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where the RHS of ( 5 ) evaluated at ψ has been substituted for bs´(ψ). Since 
f(ψ) ~ ( ( ), )u y Y m1 − +∆ ψ  is always positive, ( 30 ) is equivalent to 
( 32 ) g(ψ, y) ≥ 0 for all ψ < y and g(ψ, y) ≤ 0 for all ψ > y. 
Using line integral techniques, we obtain 
g(ψ, y) =
∆ ∆
∆
∆
∆
∆
∆
∆
∆
( )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )ψ
ψ γ ψ γ
ψ ψ
γ ψ γ
ψ
γ ψ γ
ψ
ψ γ ψ γ
ψ ψ
γu Y m
u Y m
u y Y m
u y Y m
m
u y Y m
u y Y m
u Y m
u Y m
d1
1
1
1
2
1
2
11
1
− +
− +
−
− +
− +




+
− +
− +
−
− +
− +






	



−

 
= {
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
u Y m
u Y m
RA Y m RA Y m
y
1
1
1 1
1
1 δ γ ψ γ
δ ψ
ψ δ γ ψ γ δ ψ
ψ
− +
− +
− + − − +
−
∆
∆
∆ ∆ ∆  
 + 
~ ( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) }
u Y m
u Y m
m RA Y m TRA Y m d d2
1
1 12
δ γ ψ γ
δ ψ
δ γ ψ γ δ ψ δ γ− +
− +
− + − − +
∆
∆
∆ ∆ , 
where the coefficients of static and temporal risk aversion, RA1 and TRA12, are defined in 
section 3. A set of sufficient conditions for ( 32 ) and thus for ( 30 ) is 
(i)   RA Y m RA Y m1 1( ( ), ) ( ( ), )δ ψ δ γ ψ γ− + ≤ + −∆ ∆  for all γ ∈ [-1,1] and all δ, ψ ∈ [yl, yu], 
(ii) TRA Y m RA Y m12 1( ( ), ) ( ( ), )δ ψ δ γ ψ γ− + ≤ + −∆ ∆  for all γ ∈ [-1,1] and all δ, ψ ∈ [yl, yu]. 
If the utility function exhibits utility independence16, the coefficients of static and temporal 
risk aversion depend on first-period consumption only. In this case, (i) and (ii) respectively 
become 
                                               
16
 Utility independence means that the decision concerning consumption in period t 
conditional on a consumption level ck in period k ≠ t remains the same for all possible 
values of ck. With utility independence, u(x1, x2) is either additively or multiplicatively 
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(i)’ RA RA1 1( ( )) ( ( ))δ ψ δ γ ψ− ≤ +∆ ∆  for all γ ∈ [-1,1] and all δ, ψ ∈ [yl, yu] 
(ii)’ TRA RA12 1( ( )) ( ( ))δ ψ δ γ ψ− ≤ +∆ ∆  for all γ ∈ [-1,1] and all δ, ψ ∈ [yl, yu]. 
(i)’ is implied by non-decreasing absolute risk aversion while (ii)’ holds when temporal risk 
aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. Note, however, that non-decreasing 
absolute risk aversion does not need to hold when (ii)’ holds with strict inequality. 
 
1.6.2 Supplement to the Proof of Proposition 3 
1.6.2.1 Proof of Equation ( 20 ) 
Defining ∆(y) as in ( 31 ), it is shown below that 
( 33 )  ∂∆
∂
=
=
( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
( ) ( )
( )|
y
m
u Y
u Y
F f
F y
d
m y
y
l
0
2
1
2
2ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
 
. 
Differentiating ( 33 ) w.r.t. y gives 
( 34 )  ∂∆∂ ==
' ( )
|
y
m m 0
2 22
1
2
1
2
f y
F y
u y Y
u y Y
u Y
u Y
F f
F y
d
y
y
l
( )
( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
( ) ( )
( )
−




ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
 
. 
Integrating the integral term in ( 34 ) by parts gives 
  
∂∆
∂
=
=
' ( )
|
y
m m 0
2
2f y
F y
h F
F y
d
y
y
l
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )ρ
ρ ρ

 , where 
( 35 ) 
  h(y) ≡ d
dy
u y Y
u y Y
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
2
1




 = 
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
u y Y
u y Y
RA y Y TRA y Y2
1
1 12−  . 
From ( 35 ) and ( 31 ) we immediately obtain 
                                                                                                                                                   
separable, i.e. u(x1, x2) = v1(x1) + v2(x2) or u(x1, x2) = v1(x1) v2(x2) when v1, v2 > 0 or 
u(x1, x2) = - v1(x1) v2(x2), when v1, v2 < 0. See Richard (1975). 
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∂ ′
∂
= −
∂∆′
∂
=
= =
b y
m
y
m
s
m m
( ) ( )
| |0 0
2 − −4 3 2
1
1 12
2f y
F y
u Y
u Y
RA Y TRA Y F d
y
y
l
( )
( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) 
  ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ . 
Proof of ( 33 ): 
For any fixed positive m, it follows from ( 5 ) and ( 6 ) that ∆(y) satisfies the following 
differential equation and boundary condition 
( 36 )  ∆´(y) = f y
F y
u y y Y m u y y Y m
u y y Y m
( )
( )
~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )
~ ( ( ), )
+ − − − +
− +


	


∆ ∆
∆1
, 
  ∆(yl) = ∆0(yl), 
where, similar to ( 31 ), ∆0(y) ≡ m – b0(y)/2. Evaluating the derivative of ( 36 ) w.r.t. m at 
m = 0 gives 
( 37 )  ∂∆′∂ =
( )
|
y
m m 0
 = 2 2
1 0
f y
F y
u y Y
u y Y
y
m m
( )
( )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
( )
|
−
∂∆
∂


	

=
. 
Further, since ∆(yl) = ∆0(yl) for all values of m, ∂∆∂ =
( )
|
y
m
l
m 0
= 
∂∆
∂ =
0
0
( )
|
y
m
l
m
. The latter term is 
obtained by differentiating ( 1 ) totally. We thus have 
( 38 )   ∂∆∂ =
( )
|
y
m
l
m 0
 = 
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
u y Y
u y Y
l
l
2
1
. 
The unique solution to the boundary value problem ( 37 ), ( 38 ) is ( 33 ).  QED 
 
1.6.2.2 Sufficient Conditions for the Optimality of bs(⋅) 
To establish the pseudoconcavity of ∂ ∂ =
E U b y
m m
[ ( )| ]
| 0
 in b, where E[U(b)| y] is defined in ( 3 ), 
we proceed as in section 1.6.1 of this Appendix. The (w.r.t. m) infinitesimal version of ( 30 ) 
is 
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∂
∂ ∂
≥
=
2
0
0E U y
m
m
[ | , ]
|
ψ
ψ
 for all ψ < y and ∂
∂ ∂
≤
=
2
0
0E U y
m
m
[ | , ]
|
ψ
ψ
 for all ψ > y. 
Going through some algebra, from ( 29 ) we obtain 
 
∂
∂ ∂
=
2
0
E U y
m
m
[ | , ]
|
ψ
ψ
= 2 1 2
1
2
1
f u y Y u y Y
u y Y
u Y
u Y
( )~ ( , )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
~ ( , )
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ψ
ψ
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( 39 ) 
       = 2 1 2
1
1 12f u y Y u Y
u Y
RA Y TRA Y d
y
( )~ ( , )
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )ψ
ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ψ
−   , 
which, given ( 18 ) holds, is clearly positive (negative) whenever ψ is smaller (bigger) than y. 
 
1.6.2.3 Proof of Equation ( 21 ) 
Step 1: 
Evaluated at m = 0, the derivative of E[U| y], as given by ( 17 ), w.r.t. m can be written as 
  
∂
∂
= − +
=
E U y
m
u y Y F y u y Y g y
m
[ | ] ( , )( ( ) ) ( , ) ( )
| 0
2 12 1 2 , where 
( 40 ) 
  g y u Y
u Y
f d u Y
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Proof of Step 1: 
First, rewrite interim expected utility, as given by ( 17 ), as 
( 41 )  E[U| y] = ~( ( ) / , )u y y Y m− +∆ 2 F(y) + ~( ( ), ) ( )u y Y m f d
y
y
u
+ − ∆ ρ ρ ρ . 
Evaluating the derivative of ( 41 ) w.r.t. m at m = 0 gives 
( 42 )  ∂ ∂ = − +=
E U y
m
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Substituting ∂∆ ⋅∂ =
( )
|m m 0
 from ( 33 ) into ( 43 ) gives 
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The double integral term in ( 44 ) can be manipulated as follows: 
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where the second equality follows from the application of Fubini's theorem and the third 
inequality from solving the inner integrals. 
Substituting ( 45 ) into ( 44 ), we find that ( ) ( )g y g y= , and so ( 42 ) is equivalent to 
( 40 ).             
 
Step 2: Establish that  
( 46 ) g(y) = 1
2
1 2 12
1
2 2
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) ( ( )) ( )( ( )) ( )( ( ))
u y Y
u y Y
F y h F d h F d
y
y
y
yu
l
− + − +



 ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ , where 
 
h(⋅) is defined as in ( 35 ). 
Proof of Step 2: 
Integrating g(y), as given by ( 40 ), by parts and collecting terms gives 
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Substituting h d
y
y
u
( )ρ ρ  for the term in square-brackets gives 
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Applying the second binomial formula to the term in square brackets establishes ( 46 ).  
Step 3: Substituting ( 46 ) into ( 40 ) we obtain 
∂
∂ =
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Applying the definition of h(⋅) from ( 35 ) completes the proof of ( 21 ).  QED 
 
1.6.2.4 Supplement to the Proof of Necessity of Condition (i) 
It follows from the discussion in section 1.6.1 of this Appendix that the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
‘Evaluated at b = bs(y´), ∂ ′∂ =
E U b y
m m
[ ( )| ]
| 0
 is convex in b’ and 
‘Evaluated at ψ = y´, ∂ ′∂ =
E U y
m m
[ | , ]
|
ψ
0
 is convex in ψ’. 
From ( 39 ) we obtain 
  
∂ ′
∂ ∂ =
= ′
3
2 0
E U y
m m
y
[ | , ]
||
ψ
ψ
ψ
= 2 2 12 1f y u y Y TRA y Y RA y Y( )~ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )′ ′ ′ − ′  , 
which is strictly positive if ( 22 ) holds. Thus, evaluated at ψ = y´, ∂ ′∂ =
E U y
m m
[ | , ]
|
ψ
0
 is strictly 
convex in ψ. 
 
1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4 
Taking the total differential of ( 25 ) gives 
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while differentiation of ( 24 ) yields 
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d
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δ
δ
( ) ( )
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( )3 1
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∆
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Since ∆2 does not depend on δ, we have d d
( )δ
δ
∆ ∆2 2=  > 0. It thus follows from ( 47 ) that 
b2(yl) decreases and from ( 48 ) that the slope of the bidding function b2(y) becomes steeper 
for all y which proves Proposition 4 for t = 2. For t = 1, it is shown below that 
( 49 ) d
d
∆1
δ
 > 0 for all values of a and δ. 
With this in hand, it follows immediately that d
d
( )δ
δ
∆1
 > 0, and thus, by the same arguments 
as for t = 2, db y
d
1( )
δ
 < 0 for all y. 
 
Proof of ( 49 ): 
We first introduce the following formulae: 
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where X2,2 denotes the bigger order statistic of an i.i.d. random sample (X1, X2) drawn from 
the distribution characterised by the cdf F(⋅), and ~( ) [ ( )]v X E v XX≡ . Plugging these terms 
into ( 26 ), we obtain 
 ∆1 = E[U1L - U1W] = − − + − −− − − −e e e d a e e e aam a ab a am am2 2 30
1 21 1 22( ) / ( )( ) / ( )( )/ρ ρ ρ δ  
( 50 ) 
+ − −− − −e e a e e dam ab a a2 30
1
2 1( )/ ( / )( )ρ ρρ ρ . 
Recall from Proposition 4 that db y
d
2 ( )
δ
 < 0 for all y. Consequently, both of the two terms on 
the RHS in the first line of ( 50 ) increase as δ increases. Defining g(δ ) as the term in the 
second line of ( 50 ), it remains to be established that dg
d
( )δ
δ
 > 0: 
dg
d
( )δ
δ
 = −
∂
∂
− −
− − −( / ) ( ) ( )( )/e e b e ae dam ab a a3 2 12 3 20
1 ρ ρρ
δ
ρ ρ . 
Using the results from above, db
d
y2
δ
( )  < 0, db
d
y′2
δ
( )  < 0, we define  
h(y) ≡ − ∂
∂
−
b y
e
ab y2 32( ) ( )/
δ
,   k(y) ≡ y e aea ay2 1( )− −− −   
and note the following: h(y) > 0, h´(y) > 0 for all y, while k(0) = 0, k(1) > 0, and, depending on 
a, there is at most one strictly positive y on the unit interval, y* say, such that k(y*) = 0. It 
follows that 
dg
d
( )δ
δ
 > ( / ) ( *) ( )e h y k dam 3
0
1
ρ ρ  = e h y a e aam a( *)( ) / ( )+ −− 1 3  > 0, 
since it is easily verified that the term ( )a e a+ −− 1  is positive for all a.    
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2 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ROSCA AUCTIONS IN A SOUTH-INDIAN 
VILLAGE 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Data from 23 rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) in an agricultural south-Indian 
village are used for an empirical analysis of Rosca auctions. We develop a simple SIPV 
Rosca-auction model. We show that, in contrast to standard SIPV English auctions, bidders 
overbid relative to their maximum willingness to pay in an oral ascending bid Rosca auction 
and that less aggressive bidding is socially beneficial. Estimating the structural model by 
maximum likelihood, we find that (i) aggregate features immanent in agricultural production 
are reflected by Rosca auction outcomes, (ii) bidding in Rosca groups of experienced 
organisers is less aggressive than in groups of newcomer-organisers, implying that Rosca 
organisers play a role in how socially beneficial a Rosca is, (iii) bidding in Rosca groups 
which have run more than one Rosca before tends to be less aggressive, indicating social 
gains from enduring relationships, (iv) when Rosca funds are used for productive purposes, 
bidders usually keep their information private, (v) when a bidder has an ‘emergency’ and this 
information is revealed, bidding is less aggressive indicating co-operation among bidders 
based on reciprocity. 
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2.1 Introduction 
While the first essay was motivated by the concern to close a gap in the theoretical literature, 
which had completely neglected the role of the Rosca as a risk-sharing mechanism, this essay 
is based on observations during my field study in southern India in January and February 
2001. It is thus an empirical study, though markedly different from previous ones. As has 
been mentioned in the general introduction, empirical studies of Roscas were started by 
anthropologists (Geertz, 1962) and are much more numerous than theoretical ones. All recent 
econometric studies of Roscas are exclusively concerned with the determinants of Rosca 
participation (Aliber, 2000; Anderson and Balland, 1999; Gugerty, 2000; Handa and Kirton, 
1999; Levenson and Besley, 1996). None of this econometric research, however, analyses 
Rosca auctions, but rather treats the auction allocation mechanism as a black box. 
This essay is a first attempt to open up this black box. Since Roscas are diverse and 
provide financial intermediation on a rather small scale,17 many interesting questions arise in 
the context of Rosca auctions: How should one compare the outcomes of auctions in Roscas 
with different numbers of participants and different contributions? Can existing theoretical 
models adequately explain actual auction outcomes? Do aggregate variables which affect all 
Rosca participants, like seasonality in agricultural production or in labour markets, have an 
impact on the auction outcomes? Are auctions with public information different from auctions 
with private information? Perhaps even more interesting are issues like: Is bidding in groups 
which have run several Roscas before different from bidding in newly-formed groups? Does a 
Rosca organiser’s experience influence auction outcomes? 
                                               
17
 Rosca groups typically have a size of ten to forty participants. 
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The rest of this essay is organised as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly describe the 
study village (henceforth referred to as ‘E’), present the two datasets on bidding Roscas, and 
summarise the salient features of these data together with some qualitative evidence. In 
section 2.3, we develop a stochastic Rosca model which builds on Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen’s 
(1999) idea that participants have investment projects whose returns are independently and 
identically distributed and are privately observed. In section 2.4, we discuss some 
implications of the equilibrium of this model and how deviations from the equilibrium affect 
Rosca participants' welfare. In section 2.5, a structural econometric model, which is derived 
from the theoretical model, is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The structural 
econometric model is then augmented by additional parameters suggested by the questions 
posed in the previous paragraph. This gives interesting insights into the determinants of Rosca 
auction outcomes, justifying the considerable technical and computational effort which the 
structural estimation requires. section 2.6 summarises the results and offers conclusions. 
2.2 The Data and some Qualitative Findings 
2.2.1 The Study Village 
The village E is located in a fertile river basin in the southern part of Tamil Nadu. The river 
irrigation facilitates two paddy harvests per year, one in autumn and one in winter. Recently, 
some farmers have started banana cultivation. The village population numbers about 1000, 
comprising about 230 households, of which 48 belong to scheduled castes and live in a so-
called colony about 500 meters away from the main village, where the caste Hindus live. The 
village has a post office but no bank branch. Although male literacy is as high as 57% and bus 
connections to two towns with several banking facilities are frequent, comparatively 
inexpensive and much used, financial transactions with banks play a small role for the three-
fifths of village households whose primary income source is agriculture. The only regularly 
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mentioned formal financial transaction within this group is a loan for agricultural inputs from 
an agricultural co-operative.18 
2.2.2 The Participant Sample 
In January and February 2001, I interviewed the 30 households which form the intensive 
sample in van Dillen’s (forthcoming) longitudinal study about their participation in Roscas. 
One of these 30 households was not willing to respond to my questions and was thus dropped. 
The remaining 29 households will be referred to as the ‘participant sample’. With 53% being 
scheduled caste households, this sample is not representative for the village, where only 29% 
of the households belong to scheduled castes. I decided, however, not to select a sample 
different from van Dillen’s because, first, it would not have been possible to collect the 
extensive information van Dillen had collected on her sample households and, second, her 
respondents were used to interviews on sensitive matters and, with the one exception 
mentioned above, co-operative. Despite that it is not representative of the whole village, some 
important insights can be gained from this sample. 
Apart from random Roscas, which are not the subject of this study, two types of 
bidding Roscas exist in E, monthly bidding Roscas and so called harvest bidding Roscas. The 
former meet once a month while the latter meet twice a year, after the autumn harvest in 
November, and after the winter harvest in late February or March. Three of the 29 sample 
households are participating in monthly bidding Roscas and 21 in harvest bidding Roscas. All 
three of the former households generate their income primarily outside agriculture. Harvest 
bidding Roscas, in contrast, are so predominant in E because, as mentioned above, the village 
is mostly agricultural and both farmers and agricultural wage labourers generate the bulk of 
                                               
18
 An in-depth description of various socio-economic aspects of the village can be found in 
van Dillen (forthcoming). 
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their yearly income during the two harvests. For this reason, the present study focuses on 
harvest bidding Roscas and the information in Table 1 and Table 3 refers exclusively to such 
Roscas. 
Table 1 combines some of van Dillen's data with the findings of my own survey. 
Although there are almost four years between her and my field study, this need not affect the 
consistency of inference obtained from combining the two datasets because, within this 
sample, participation in bidding Roscas stretches over 60 to 78 months (with one exception of 
132 months), and so it can be argued that the household characteristics reported by van Dillen 
are well suited for explaining observed Rosca participation of her sample households four 
years later. 
We first deal with those households which do not participate in any harvest bidding 
Rosca. The three households within this group from the main village (131, 132, 186) are not 
active in agriculture. Household 131 is a retired widow, 132 is a shopkeeper and 186 a 
carpenter. Within our sample, all main-village households which are active in agriculture also 
participate in at least one harvest bidding Rosca. Turning to those five colony households 
which do not participate in harvest bidding Roscas, only one, 106, a shopkeeper, is not 
primarily in agriculture, whereas the other four (22, 99, 112, 113) are primarily agricultural 
labourers, and extremely poor ones at that. The head of household 22 is a widow, while the 
head of household 99 has to support two wives. Since the heads of households 112 and 113 
are attached farm servants, they receive regular incomes, which are less subject to seasonal 
variations than incomes of agricultural wage labourers. To summarise, the main determinant 
of participation in harvest bidding Roscas in E is a regular harvest income which has to be 
high enough to finance the regular contribution, which amounts to at least Rs. 500 in the 
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participant sample (see Table 1).19 This hypothesis is supported by the respondents, who 
frequently mentioned the timing of payments in a harvest Rosca as a particular advantage 
over bank loan schemes.20 
 
                                               
19
 By way of comparison: a day’s wage of a male agricultural worker, depending on the 
season, ranges between Rs. 40 and 80. 
20
 While, according to respondents in the participant sample, the timing of co-operative loans 
for agricultural inputs is adapted to the crop cycle, big loans for the purchase of productive 
assets have to be repaid in monthly instalments. 
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Table 1. The participant sample and selected household characteristics 
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9 4 0 3 2 0 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 3000 5000  8000 
13 2 0 1 0 -1 1 2 1 1 3 2 0 500 1000  1500 
19 1 3 0 2 -1 1 3 0 2 1 1 1 1000 1000  1000 
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 0 3000   3000 
22 1 0 1 0 -1 1 3 1 3 1 0 0 
   
0 
74 4 4 0 0 0 -1 1 0 3 2 1 1 2500   2500 
84 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 500 1000  1500 
85 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 1 1 1000   1000 
86 4 2 1 2 0 0 3 0 1 2 1 1 1000   1000 
88 4 2 0 2 1 1 3 0 3 2 1 0 1000   1000 
89 1 0 0 1 -1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 2000   2000 
91 1 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 2 2 2 0 1000 2000  3000 
99 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 
   
0 
103 1 2 2 3 1 0 3 0 1 1 2 0 1000 2000  3000 
106 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
   
0 
107 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 3000   3000 
108 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 1 2 1 1 1 2000   2000 
109 4 3 3 3 0 0 3 0 1 1 3 0 1000 1000 3000 5000 
112 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 
   
0 
113 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
   
0 
116 1 0 0 2 -1 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 1500   1500 
118 1 0 2 1 -1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1500   1500 
120 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 2000   2000 
121 1 3 1 1 0 -1 3 0 2 1 2 2 1000 3000  4000 
131 2 2 0 0 -1 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 
   
0 
132 2 0 0 0 1 1 4 2 3 3 0 0 
   
0 
133 4 4 4 2 1 -1 2 0 2 1 2 1 5000 5000  10000 
186 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 
   
0 
214 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 1 2500   2500 
 
Source: of columns 2-11: van Dillen (forthcoming) 
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Table 2. Variable-values in Table 1 
Values 0 1 2 3 4 
Caste - Pallar, Pariah 
(scheduled castes) 
Pandaram 
(forward caste) 
Pillaimar 
(forward caste) 
Maravar 
(backward caste) 
Land property No land property - 0.01-0.50 acre 0.51-0.99 acre 1 acre + 
Leased land No leased land 0.01-0.50 acre 0.51-0.99 acre 1.00-1.99 acre 2 acre + 
 
Livestock 
 
No cattle 
1-2         
cows/buffaloes or 
bullocks 
3-4 
cows/buffaloes 
or bullocks 
More than 4 
cows/buffaloes 
or bullocks 
- 
Household 
composition 
'gender' 
Equal number 
of female and 
male members 
More 
female 
members*  
More 
male 
members 
- - - 
Household 
composition 
'labour force' 
 
Equal number 
of active and 
dependent 
members 
More 
dependent 
members* 
More 
active 
members 
- - - 
Degree of 
income 
diversification 
One source of 
income 
Two sources of income Three sources of 
income 
Four sources of 
income 
Five sources of 
income 
 
Degree of in-
come security 
(non-agricul-
tural income) 
Income only 
from unskilled 
casual work, 
unskilled self-
employment and 
home-work 
At least one income 
from skilled work, or 
self-employment based 
on skilled work 
At least one 
minor formal 
employment 
(govt., private) 
At least one full 
time formal 
employment 
(private) 
At least one full 
time formal 
employment 
(government) 
 
Education 
No member has 
any formal 
education 
No member age 14+ 
studied more than 7th 
standard 
At least one 
member studied 
8th to 10th 
standard 
At least two 
members 
studied 8th to 
10th standard 
At least one 
member studied 
more than 10th 
standard 
 
Skills 
 
- 
 
Ordinary skills 
At least one 
member has 
skills 
At least two 
members have 
different skills  
At least three 
members have 
different skills 
      
# Roscas Number of harvest bidding Roscas in which the respondent household participates 
# Roscas 
active 
Number of harvest bidding Roscas in which the respondent household is an active participant, i.e. in 
which it has not yet received a pot 
Contribution 1 Full contribution to the first Rosca in which the household participates. When multiple participation 
occurs, this is the Rosca with the lowest contribution 
Contribution 2 Full contribution to the second Rosca in which the household participates. When multiple participation occurs, this is the Rosca with the second-lowest contribution 
Contribution 3 Full contribution to the third Rosca in which the household participates. When multiple participation 
occurs, this is the Rosca with the highest contribution 
Sum of 
contributions 
Sum of the full contributions to all harvest bidding Roscas in which the respondent household 
participates 
* in this case, the indicator in question is set equal to -1 
Source of rows 2-11: van Dillen (forthcoming) 
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Table 3. Frequency table of participation and active participation in the participant sample
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To quantify some determinants of the extent of harvest bidding Rosca participation in 
the participant sample, I conducted a Tobit analysis with the sum of the Rosca contributions 
of a household as the dependent variable. The indicators constructed by van Dillen are used as 
explanatory variables.21 Not surprisingly, operational landholdings, which approximate the 
                                               
21
 Inference from such a regression may be flawed by an endogeneity problem which can 
arise from two sources. First, assets which appear as regressors may have been purchased 
with funds obtained from a Rosca whose contribution appears in the regressand. In the 
present sample, however, there is only one single case where a sample household received 
a pot before van Dillen's survey. This is household 109, which obtained Rs. 5500 after the 
winter harvest in 1996 from one of the two Roscas where it contributes Rs. 1000 per 
harvest. The funds were used to replace two old bullocks, which appear in the explanatory 
variable livestock. Second, the explanatory variables 'leased land' and 'degree of income 
diversification' may themselves be functions of some not-observed variables in the 
background, like managerial skills, which also play a role in a household's decision about 
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income from farming, are the most important determinant followed by the asset variable 
livestock. Skills of the household members, as well as caste, in contrast, are insignificant. The 
negative sign on the variable ‘degree of income diversification’ is as expected since 
diversification usually implies more income from outside the agricultural sector. Harvest 
Roscas, however, are particularly popular among and suited for villagers who generate their 
income primarily in agriculture, as has been explained above. Because of the limited number 
of observations where the dependent variable is different from zero (21 cases), the number of 
regressors was limited to the ones shown in Table 4. Inclusion of more regressors gives a 
problem of perfect prediction and no further insights. 
 
Table 4. Tobit analysis of the determinants of the extent of Rosca participation 
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Rosca participation. In this case, the said explanatory variables are not purely exogenous. 
In the light that only 7 of the 31 Roscas in the sample have already been operating when 
the explanatory variables were recorded, we may argue, however, that the explanatory 
variables in question are, at least for the most part, predetermined, which suffices to 
guarantee consistent estimates. 
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2.2.3 The Organiser Sample 
Since the aim of this study is to investigate Rosca auctions, information from organisers is 
indispensable because none of the respondents in the participant sample kept records about his 
participation in Roscas. At the very most, they could recall those auctions which they had 
won. Many respondents, especially those in the colony, were not even aware of many of the 
modalities of the Roscas in which they participated, such as the number of participants or the 
amount in the pot. As can be calculated from Table 3, of those 31 Roscas in which the 
participant-sample households were participating at the time of the interview, 14 auctions had 
been won by sample respondents. Thus, these 29 interviews contain only limited data on just 
14 auctions. 
Since none of the Roscas which I could observe in E is registered with the 
government, as Tamil state law requires, organisers are generally unwilling to admit that they 
administer a Rosca. I therefore pursued the strategy of asking the respondents in the 
participant sample to convince the organisers of those Roscas in which they participate to 
respond to my questions. I thus succeeded in interviewing 11 of the 19 bidding Rosca 
organisers whom I could find in E. I included all their Roscas which were currently going on 
or had ended not earlier than after the autumn harvest of 1999 and for which written records 
were available. This yielded information on 23 Roscas and 149 auctions. Apart from the 
modalities of each Rosca, which will be discussed later in this essay, for each auction, I 
recorded the winning bid, the winner’s use of the pot, and whether this purpose was his 
private information during the auction. The dataset as a whole is reproduced in Table 9 and 
some summary statistics are provided in Table 5. Note that each line in this dataset refers to 
the outcome of one auction. Thus, for example, if at the time of the interview, in a Rosca with 
10 participants, 6 auctions had already taken place, this Rosca contributes 6 lines to the 
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dataset. Of course, the variables 'contribution', 'number of participants', and 'fraction of caste 
Hindus' take the same respective values in all of these six lines. 
 
Table 5. The organiser sample: some descriptive statistics 
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While the participant sample has extensive information on each participant 
household’s characteristics, organisers did not want to reveal the identity of the participants in 
their Roscas. Therefore, apart from the few cases where a respondent of the participant 
sample also appears in a Rosca which is in the organiser sample, we do not have information 
on the characteristics of Rosca participants in the organiser sample. For this reason, 
unobserved heterogeneity could pose certain problems at the stage of estimation. 
2.2.4 Stylised Facts about Harvest Bidding Roscas in E 
We now combine the evidence from the participant and the organiser sample to summarise 
some key features of harvest bidding Roscas which are important to set up a theoretical model 
that will serve as a benchmark to explain Rosca auction outcomes in E: 
1. Rosca funds are almost never used for consumption or domestic purposes (purpose 
codes 14 and 31 appear only twice in 128 auctions where the organiser recalled what 
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an auction’s winner used the pot for).22 Instead Rosca funds are mostly used for 
productive investment (purpose codes 1 through 9, 80 of 128 cases), e.g. buying a 
field plot or starting banana cultivation, or what villagers call “emergencies” (purpose 
codes 10, 11 and 13, 31 cases), which are marriages or the ritual puberty function of a 
daughter or a close relative. Less frequent uses are buying jewellery, settling debt, 
medical treatment and children’s education, which may also be regarded as 
investments since they increase or consolidate a household’s net wealth and human 
capital, respectively.23 
2. When there is no ‘emergency’, information on a winner’s purpose is mostly private 
(102 out of 118 cases). This means that if someone intends to obtain a pot to buy a 
field plot, for example, he does not tell other bidders about his intention before the 
auction. Organisers and participants say that it is advantageous to keep a potential 
investment use of Rosca funds secret. 
3. When information on the purpose of an auction’s winner is public, it is mostly an 
‘emergency’ (24 out of 40 cases). Marriage arrangements are usually known 
throughout the village well in advance so that, in these cases, it is not a bidder’s 
decision whether to make the information on his purpose public or not. Organisers and 
participants say that bidding is less competitive in such cases. It is claimed, instead, 
                                               
22
 See Table 10 for the purpose codes. 
23
 Organisers were sure that, when the purpose is unknown, it is not an ‘emergency’. 
Moreover, in those 21 cases, the winner always kept his purpose secret, with one exception 
where, according to the organiser, the winner said before the auction that he needed money 
without further specifying why. 
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that other bidders understand the need in question and that bidding does not go as 
high. 
4. Lying about the use of Rosca funds (e.g. pretending a marriage when there is none) is 
virtually impossible because, ex post, the use of the funds is obvious to anybody in the 
village and dishonest people are excluded from future Roscas. Such an exclusion was 
considered a prohibitively severe sanction by all participants interviewed. 
5. Defaulting on contributions also results in exclusion from future Roscas. Out of the 11 
organisers who responded, only one mentioned problems with outstanding 
contributions.24 If somebody pays a contribution late, the organiser has to step in. 
6. Participants say that it is crucial to be able to obtain a pot when there is an unforeseen 
opportunity or ‘emergency’, and that, for this reason, random Roscas are useless. 
7. In the participant sample, in 10 out of 14 cases where the respondents had already 
obtained a pot of an ongoing Rosca, the winner used the pot for a different purpose 
than he had been planning when he had joined the Rosca, or he did not have a 
particular idea what to use the funds for when he had joined the Rosca. In three other 
cases where the participants knew in advance what to use the funds for (purchase of a 
field plot or marriage of a daughter), the timing (in which round to take the pot) was 
not determined at the beginning. The only case in which a winner knew when he 
wanted to take the pot and what to use it for, was someone who took the first pot to 
repair his house (household 133). 
8. In the organiser sample, the observed winning bid fluctuates in 15 of 16 Roscas where 
at least five auctions were recorded, i.e. there exists a t, such that, in the t-th round, a 
                                               
24
 He was, however, the only organiser in the sample who was incapable of keeping proper 
records of his Roscas and made a somewhat confused impression during the interviews. 
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higher winning bid is observed than in the (t – 1)-th round, even when the funds are 
used for the same purpose. 
9. Both organisers and participants of bidding Roscas feel that unrestrained bidding is 
bad for the welfare of the group. It is considered advantageous if, in each round, a 
Rosca allocates as much money as possible to the winner and does not favour losing 
bidders through a high winning bid, which is paid by the winner and equally 
distributed among the losers of the auction. 
Since investment use of Rosca funds is the most frequent case in E (see observation 1 of the 
list above), a model where each bidder’s desire to finance an investment project determines 
his bid seems appropriate as a benchmark. From 2 and 4 we conclude that, in such a model, 
the kind of investment project to which a bidder has access is his private information. 
Observations 6, 7 and 8 can be interpreted as clear evidence against a deterministic Rosca 
model because, to apply such a model, participants would have to know the purpose for which 
to use the funds from the Rosca in advance, which contradicts 7. Moreover, in the 
deterministic model of Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), the winning bid decreases 
monotonically from auction to auction during the course of the Rosca, which contradicts 8. 
Observation 5 implies that we can neglect any problems of defaulting on contributions. 
Observation 9 implies that the marginal disutility to an auction’s winner from receiving less 
money due to bidding in the auction is higher than the sum of the marginal utilities to that 
same auction’s losers from receiving more money through the distribution of the winning bid. 
2.3 The Model 
We start by formalising the course of a harvest bidding Rosca in E. As in the preceding essay, 
we will assume that each participant is always able to pay his contribution. This assumption is 
supported by evidence from the organisers (see observation 5 in section 2.2.4). 
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Consider a bidding Rosca with n participants, including the organiser. At the 
beginning of each meeting, each participant pays m Rupees and an amount of z Rupees is 
deducted from the collected contributions as commission for the organiser (in practice, z 
ranges between 2 and 5% of nm). Consequently, the pot amounts to mn - z. In each round 
except the second and the last, an oral ascending bid auction among those participants who 
have not yet received a pot takes place. In such an auction, the bid b is increased 
continuously. The winner receives the pot minus his last bid, bw say, in total mn – z – bw, 
where bw is equally distributed among those bidders who have lost the auction.25 At the last 
(i.e. the n-th) meeting, that participant who has not won any of the previous auctions receives 
the pot without a discount. At the second meeting, the organiser receives the collected 
contributions nm without a discount. For this reason, he is not a bidder in any of the 
auctions.26 
                                               
25
 Other field studies report different rules for the distribution of the winning bid. It may be 
added to future pots or distributed among all participants of the Rosca, not only the auction 
participants. See Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) for a discussion. 
26
 9 of the 23 Roscas in the organiser sample operate somewhat differently. There, the 
organiser receives a fixed commission only in the last round and, in each auction, shares 
the winning bid equally with the auction’s losers. We shall refer to this form of 
commission as ‘variable commission’. For the theoretical analysis, we will exclusively 
focus on the fixed commission regime. When we turn to the estimation, it will be briefly 
discussed how the results obtained for the fixed commission regime can be modified to 
accommodate the variable commission cases. 
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To formalise the ideas developed at the end of the previous section, suppose that each 
individual is risk neutral and that, in period t, his preferences can be described by the 
intertemporally separable von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
 U qt
t
t
=
−
=
∞
∑δ τ τ
τ
, 
where qτ denotes consumption measured in Rupees in period τ and δ < 1 is a discount factor 
for future consumption. Assume that each period covers one paddy crop cycle so that there 
are two periods per agricultural year. Suppose that, after every harvest, each Rosca participant 
has access to an investment project which costs mn – z. In each period, the profit which the 
investment project yields is determined by a random variable, R, which is independently and 
identically distributed over the participants with the smooth cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) F(r). The profit from an investment creates an instantaneous utility equivalent to 
consuming (mn – z)r, where r is the realisation of R. Further assume that each individual i 
privately observes his realisation of R in period t, rit, before the auction in period t. We 
assume that investing (mn – z) is always preferred to consuming (mn – z), i.e. F(r) = 0 for 
r < 1. We assume that the winner of an auction has to consume or invest the funds obtained 
from the Rosca instantaneously. Outside credit is available to finance the gap between the 
funds received from the Rosca, (mn – z – bw), and the cost of the investment project (of course 
this gap is equal to bw). Every Rupee borrowed creates an instantaneous disutility of c > 1. To 
ensure that bw has to be financed completely by outside credit, which is essential to keep the 
analysis tractable, we will assume that saving outside the Rosca is not possible. 
In setting up this model we have implicitly assumed that, after observing rit, the 
individual has access to the funds from only one bidding Rosca. A clue whether this 
assumption is too restrictive can be gained from the participant sample, where information on 
each individual’s active participation in Roscas (i.e. where he can still win a pot) is available. 
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For our model, only multiple active participation causes a problem while multiple 
participation alone does not. As can be seen from Table 3, of the 13 sample members who are 
active participants in at least one Rosca, 4 are simultaneously active in more than one Rosca. 
Thus our assumption holds at least for the big majority of the participant-sample data. Note 
that, in the organiser sample, which will be used for the estimation, we do not have any 
information on multiple participation. 
We now turn to the Rosca auction which, in E, is invariably of the oral ascending bid 
(OA) form, i.e. those participants who have not yet received a pot meet and submit successive 
oral bids until only one bidder, the winner, remains. The way we analyse OA-Rosca auctions 
in this essay is the same as in section 1.2, although, in the present case, we also consider 
Rosca auctions with more than two bidders, which requires additional assumptions. To make 
this essay self-contained, we repeat the argument of section 1.2 with the modifications needed 
for the cases with more than two bidders. Since a somewhat lengthy argument is required to 
derive the bidding equilibrium which will serve as a benchmark for the estimation, we give a 
brief overview over the course of the argument which follows. As in the first essay, the 
crucial point is that, in contrast to standard SIPV OA auctions, OA-Rosca auctions do not 
have a bidding equilibrium in dominant strategies because, in a Rosca auction, the winning 
bid is distributed among the losers. Thus, to obtain a tractable model of an OA-Rosca auction, 
we will first establish the payoff equivalence of an OA-Rosca auction and a second-price 
sealed bid (SPS)-Rosca auction. Then we will analyse the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a SPS-
Rosca auction. In section 2.4 we will discuss how the equilibrium bidding strategy thus 
derived is different from truth-telling, which is the well-known dominant-strategy bidding 
equilibrium in standard OA auctions. Note that, throughout this essay, we always make a clear 
distinction between standard auctions and Rosca auctions. 
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Since we have to refer to standard auctions at several stages of the theoretical and 
econometric analysis, it is appropriate to recall the setting of what will be referred to as a 
‘standard auction’. There is one seller, who owns a single, indivisible item and K buyers. Each 
bidder knows K and his own valuation (or value, in short) for the item, which is the maximum 
amount he would be willing to pay for the item, but none of the other bidders’ values. The 
values are identically and independently distributed (see Matthews, 1990). It is further 
assumed that the seller cannot set a minimum price. 
As in the first essay, we model an OA-Rosca auction as a so-called button auction, 
where each bidder presses a button as the standing bid continuously increases. A bidder drops 
out of the bidding process once he releases his button. The auction is over once there is only 
one bidder still pressing his button. He receives the pot at a price equal to the standing bid at 
the moment his last competitor dropped out, bw. 
For the derivation of a bidding equilibrium in the Rosca button auction, it is useful to 
consider a second-price, sealed bid (SPS)-Rosca auction.27 In such an auction, the active 
participants submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The highest bid wins and the winner pays a 
price equal to the second highest bid submitted. Although, at least in the context of Roscas, 
this type of auction is empirically irrelevant, we shall argue that, under certain assumptions, 
its equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the OA-Rosca auction. We will assume that in the 
button auction, at each level of the standing bid, each bidder only observes whether the 
auction is still going on or not, i.e. he cannot observe how many other bidders are still holding 
down their buttons or at which level of the standing bid other bidders have quit the auction. 
Thus each bidder’s problem is to decide when to release his button. Suppose that each bidder 
releases his button at a standing bid equal to his bid in the SPS-Rosca auction. If all bidders 
                                               
27
 For standard auctions, this particular auction protocol is also known as Vickrey auction. 
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follow this rule, the payoffs to all participants are equal in the SPS and the OA-Rosca auction. 
Further, since, during the button auction, by assumption, a bidder does not obtain any further 
information than a bidder of a SPS-Rosca auction has, the reduced normal form games 
corresponding to the second-price sealed bid and the oral ascending bid Rosca auction are 
identical. Thus they are strategically equivalent, which implies that the equilibrium of the 
SPS-Rosca auction is also an equilibrium of the OA-Rosca auction. 
The assumption that, in the course of the bidding, a bidder of an OA-Rosca auction 
does not obtain any further information than a bidder of a SPS-Rosca auction can be justified 
by the observation that, in the former auction, at any level of the standing bid, it is usually not 
clear how many bidders are still in the auction and whether any of the bidders has already quit 
the bidding process because Rosca auction records show that often a bidder raises the 
standing bid for the first time after the auction has already gone on for many thousands of 
Rupees. The problem that, in contrast to a button auction, bidding increments in an OA 
auction are of a discrete nature, should be negligible since auction records indicate that, 
before the bidding stops, bidding increments are usually as small as 0.1 to 0.2% of the amount 
in the pot. 
To derive the bidding equilibrium of a SPS-Rosca auction, suppose that there are K 
identical bidders, where, at the t-th meeting, K = n – t + 1, if 2 < t < n, and K = n – 1, if t = 1. 
Before the auction, each bidder observes the revenue of his investment project, rkt, k = 1,…,K. 
Let us consider a bidder, k´ say, who is confronted with K – 1 other bidders who all bid 
according to the bidding function bt(r), which is strictly increasing in r. Suppose k´ also 
adopts the bidding function bt(⋅), but that he has the option to pretend not to have observed 
rk t′  but ρ, say. 
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If he submits b(ρ) given his actual rk t′  and wins the auction, his expected utility from 
the Rosca participation is U r nm z r cE b R Rt
w
K K K K( | ) ( ) [ ( )| ]: :ρ ρ≡ − − <− − − −1 1 1 1 , where, for 
notational convenience, we have written r instead of rk t′  and dropped the subscript t. (nm – z)r 
is his utility from engaging in the investment project with profit r.28 Rj l:  denotes the j-th 
lowest order statistic from a sample of size l. Thus E b R b R bK K K K[ ( )| ( ) ( )]: :− − − − ≤1 1 1 1 ρ  is the 
expected value of the highest bid submitted by the K – 1 other bidders conditional on the 
event that none of these K – 1 bidders bids higher than b(ρ). Of course, if b(⋅) is strictly 
increasing, as we have assumed, the events b R bK K( ) ( ):− − ≤1 1 ρ  and RK K− − ≤1 1: ρ  are identical. 
Since, on average, k´ has to take a loan of E b R RK K K K[ ( )| ]: :− − − − ≤1 1 1 1 ρ  to finance the costs of 
the investment, we have to subtract cE b R RK K K K[ ( )| ]: :− − − − ≤1 1 1 1 ρ  from the profit of the 
investment project. If k´ wins the auction, then in the remaining rounds, he can neither receive 
a pot, nor enjoy a fraction of the winning bid. Thus, in this case, his expected utility from 
future Rosca rounds is zero.29 The probability of winning the auction is 
P P Rw K K( ) ( ):ρ ρ≡ ≤− −1 1 . 
                                               
28
 At this stage, we assume that it is always advantageous to invest the funds obtained from 
the Rosca instead of consuming them. This does not need to hold in general and will be 
checked for the present data in section 2.5. 
29
 Note that, strictly speaking, we would also have to subtract m, the contribution each 
participant has to pay at the beginning of each meeting, from U rw( | )ρ . Since, however, 
after joining the Rosca, each participant has to pay m at every meeting irrespective of the 
auction outcome, this is not relevant for the strategic analysis. 
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If k´ submits b(ρ) and this turns out to be the second highest bid submitted, his 
expected utility is U r b K EUt
l
t
l1 1( | ) ( ) / ( )ρ ρ≡ − + . In this case, k´’s bid is the price the winner 
pays and this price is equally shared by the K – 1 losers of this auction. EUt
l
 is the expected 
utility from future rounds in which the auction’s loser can still enjoy a fraction of the winning 
bid and win a pot. A discussion of this term follows at the end of this section. The probability 
of submitting the second highest bid, if k´ pretends to have observed ρ, is 
P P R Rl K K K K
1
1 1 2 1( ) ( ): :ρ ρ ρ≡ > ∩ ≤− − − − . 
Finally, if b(ρ) turns out to be smaller than the second highest bid submitted, k´’s 
expected utility is U r E b R K R EUt
l
K K K K t
l2
2 1 2 11( | ) [ ( ) / ( )| ]: :ρ ρ≡ − > +− − − − . This expression is 
derived along the same lines of reasoning as in the other two cases above. The probability of 
submitting a bid lower than the second highest bid is P P Rl K K2 2 1( ) ( ):ρ ρ≡ >− − . 
Consequently, k´’s expected utility before submitting his bid is given by 
( 51 )  U r U r P U r P U r Pt tw w tl l tl l( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ≡ + +1 1 2 2 . 
To derive the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of such an auction, we determine how an 
infinitesimal change in the pretended return ρ affects expected utility. Formally, we take the 
derivative of ( 51 ) w.r.t. ρ to obtain 
( 52 ) dU r
d
K F F b f nm z r EU c bt K tl( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ρρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ν ν ρ= − − ′ + − − − +
−1 1 12       , 
where we have substituted Pl1( )ρ  = 1 – ( Pw ( )ρ  + Pl2 ( )ρ ), Pw ( )ρ  = F K( )ρ  −1  and Pl2 ( )ρ  
= 1 1 22− − − −−F K K FK( ) ( ) ( )ρ ρ    . ν = K – 1 denotes the number of participants who share 
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the winning bid.30 In equilibrium, nothing can be gained from pretending a different return 
than the one actually observed. Formally, we equate the RHS of ( 52 ) with r substituted for ρ 
to zero. This gives a first-order differential equation: 
( 53 )  ( ) ( )'( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )lb r F r f r c b r EU nm z rtν ν − = + + − −   . 
Obviously, the degree of non-linearity of ( 53 ) crucially depends on F’s hazard rate, f/(1-F). 
To obtain a tractable model for the empirical analysis, consider the exponential distribution 
with shift parameter 1 and scale parameter θ, F(r) = 1- exp(-(r-1)/θ), θ > 0. It is well known 
that the hazard rate of this distribution is constant and equal to θ -1. In this case, ( 53 ) has one 
linear solution31, 
( 54 )  b r
c
nm z r
c
EUt
e
t
t
t
t
t
t
l( ) ( )≡
+
− +
+



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−
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

ν
ν
θ
ν1 1
, 
where we have put the subscript t again to indicate which terms depend on the round in which 
the auction takes place. Thus, with the exponential distribution, each auction in the course of 
the Rosca has a linear equilibrium bidding function which is given by ( 54 ). 
It has been assumed in the derivations that the equilibrium bidding function is strictly 
increasing. It is easily verified from ( 54 ) that this is indeed the case. Further, as sufficient 
conditions for the optimality of be ( )⋅ , we need to establish that, for a bidder who observes r, it 
                                               
30
 We introduce the parameter ν at this point because this will make the results derived for 
Roscas with a fixed commission regime easily applicable to Roscas with a variable 
commission. See footnote 26. 
31
 Equation ( 53 ) has other, non-linear solutions which will not be discussed here because 
they make the econometric model computationally intractable. 
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is in fact globally optimal to bid b re ( ) , provided the other bidders follow be ( )⋅ . Towards this 
end, substitute be ( )⋅  for b(⋅) into ( 52 ). Most terms cancel out and we obtain 
 
dU r
d
K F nm z f r r
r
t
b b
K
e
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,
,| ( ) ( )
ρ
ρ
ρ ν ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
⋅ = ⋅
−
= − − −
> <
< >



1
0
0
2
. 
In words, given that the other bidders follow be ( )⋅ , U rt ( | )ρ  is pseudoconcave in ρ for all 
values of r. Thus a bidder gains from pretending a higher (lower) revenue ρ, whenever ρ is 
smaller (bigger) than r, which implies that bidding b re ( )  is strictly preferred to bidding be ( )ρ  
for all ρ ≠ r. 
We now briefly discuss EUt
l
. In the last but one round, we have 
( 55 )  EU mn z E R mn znl − = − = − +1 1δ δ θ( ) [ ] ( )( ) , 
which is the discounted expected revenue of the investment project which the recipient of the 
n-th pot realises. More generally, consider the expected utility of a loser in an auction in the 
(t-1)-th round before he observes rt. In the following (i.e. the t-th) round, he either wins the 
pot and invests or he loses the auction and receives a share of the winning bid plus a loser’s 
expected utility, EUt
l
. In the symmetric bidding equilibrium characterised by bt
e ( )⋅ , the 
bidder who observes the highest revenue wins the auction. Thus, on average, the revenue of 
an investment project realised in round t is ( ) [ ]:nm z E RK Kt t− , while the winning bid is 
determined by the second highest bidder, on average E b Rte K Kt t[ ( )]:−1 . Before observing rt, in 
equilibrium, the probability of being the winner of the auction in round t is (1/Kt) while the 
probability of losing is (Kt-1)/Kt. We thus obtain the recursive relationship 
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       EU
K
nm z E R cE b R K
K
E
b R
EUt
l
t
K K t
e
K K
t
t
t
e
K K
t
t
l
t t t t
t t
− −
−
= − − +
−




	




+









1 1 1
1 1δ
ν
( ) [( )] [ ( )] ( ): : :  , 
( 56 ) 
3 ≤ t ≤ n–1. 
Since the organiser receives the second pot without a discount, in the second round, all active 
participants can be treated like losers and consequently, for the first auction, we have 
( 57 )  EU EUl l1 2= δ . 
With equations ( 55 ) to ( 57 ), EUtl  can be obtained for any t by recursion. Note that 
ex ante expected utility from joining a Rosca before observing r1, EU, is just 
EU ml
n
0
11
1
/ δ δ
δ
−
−
−
−
, where EU l0  is obtained from ( 56 ) with t = 1, and 
1
1
1
−
−
−δ
δ
n
m  
= δ t
t
n
m
−
=
∑ 11  is the disutility from the contribution that has to be paid in each of the following 
n periods. 
With ex ante expected utility derived, a remark on the general approach to Rosca 
participation taken in this essay is in order. Of course, it is an interesting task to determine an 
optimal portfolio of Roscas for an individual given certain individual characteristics such as 
income and assets, and possibly the number of daughters. To analyse observed auction 
outcomes, however, in this study, we take each Rosca participation as given and set the 
problem of an optimal Rosca portfolio aside. 
2.4 The Notion of Overbidding in Rosca Auctions and the Gains from Lower 
Bidding 
It is well known that, in a standard SIPV second-price sealed bid auction, each bidder submits 
his maximum willingness to pay for the item auctioned. For obvious reasons, this dominant 
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strategy is also referred to as ‘truth-telling’. In Proposition 1 of the first essay, it has been 
shown that, under the assumptions set out there, in the bidding equilibrium, bidders in an OA-
Rosca auction overbid relative to their maximum willingness to pay. We will now analyse this 
question in the context of the present model. Towards this end, we first need to determine a 
bidder’s maximum willingness to pay in a Rosca auction as a function of his observed profit r, 
b0(r) say. First consider a standard SIPV auction and a bidder whose valuation for the item 
auctioned is υ. By definition, this bidder’s maximum willingness to pay for the item is found 
by equating the utility from buying the item at a price of b0, Uw(b0|υ) ≡ υ – b0, with the utility 
from not getting the item at price b0, Ul(b0|υ) ≡ 0. Applying this equation to the Rosca case 
gives 
( 58 )  ( ) ( / )nm z r cb b EUt t t t tl− − = +0 0 ν  
and thus b r
c
nm z r EU b r nm z
c
b rt t t
t
t t
l
t
e
t
t
t
t
e
t
0
21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )= + − − = −
−
+
<
ν
ν
ν
ν
θ  . That is, in the 
bidding equilibrium, each bidder adds the constant ν
ν
θt
t
nm z
c
( )
( )
−
+1 2
 to his maximum willingness 
to pay to determine his bid. In this sense, as in the first essay, Rosca bidders ‘overbid’ (like 
bidders in a standard SIPV first-price auction underbid). Note that, for νt ≥ 1, the extent of 
overbidding is strictly decreasing in νt, which means that overbidding becomes more and 
more pronounced as the Rosca proceeds. The intuition behind this is that, the smaller νt, the 
bigger is the fraction of the winning bid a losing bidder receives, which increases the 
incentive to overbid. The extent of overbidding is decreasing in c because high costs of credit 
make the case when one wins at a price higher than b0(r) more painful. 
It is interesting to calculate how frequently an auction’s winner ex post regrets that he 
has overbid. Suppose a bidder observes rw and wins the auction. Clearly, this winner would 
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prefer not to receive the pot at a price of bw whenever b rt
w0 ( ) < bw, i.e. when the price he has 
to pay exceeds his maximum willingness to pay. If all bidders follow the equilibrium strategy 
bt
e ( )⋅ , the probability of this event, conditional on rw, is Pr(vt, c| rw) 
≡ P b r b R R rt
w
t
e
K K K K
w0
1 1 1 1( ) ( )|: :< <− − − −   and the total probability of a winner’s regret Pr(vt, c) 
≡ P v c r f r drt K Kt t, | ( ): 1
∞  = 1 1 1− − +exp / ( )ν t c  , where f K Kt t: ( )⋅  denotes the density of 
RK Kt t: . As the extent of overbidding itself, P
r(vt, c) is decreasing in νt and c. To give a 
numerical example, if the disutility from borrowing exceeds the amount of the loan by 50%, 
i.e. c = 1.5, then, in the last auction, where ν = 1, Pr(1, 1.5) ≅ 0.33, which means that in about 
one third of such cases, the winner will regret having overbid. On the other hand, in a Rosca 
with 10 participants, in the first auction, ν1 = 8, and we obtain Pr(8, 1.5) ≅ 0.074, which 
means that we have to expect a winner’s regret in 7.4% of the cases. The fact that regret 
occurs with a positive probability is in line with casual evidence from the field study where 
one organiser reported that, after the end of an auction in one of his Roscas, the winner 
wanted to renegotiate the auction outcome saying he had not meant to bid so high and actually 
had no use for the money in that period. 
 One goal of the empirical part of this essay is to detect potential differences of the 
bidding functions in Roscas with different characteristics. Imposing the assumption of Bayes-
Nash equilibrium bidding on all observed auction outcomes, however, obscures such 
differences. For this reason, let us now consider the (n-2)-vector b ≡ (b1(⋅), b3(⋅),…,bn− ⋅1( ) ) 
and suppose that in a Rosca with n participants, in the auction in round t, all bidders bid 
according to bt(⋅), where bt is an arbitrary strictly increasing function of rt. Ex ante, the 
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expected utility from joining such a Rosca is given by EU(b) ≡ EU ml
n
0
11
1
( ) /b δ δ
δ
−
−
−
−
, where 
EU l0 ( )b  is given implicitly by the recursive equations 
( 59 ) EU
nm z t n
K
nm z E R E b R c K K EU t n
EU t
t
l
t
K K t K K
t
t
t t
l
t
l
t t t t− −
≡
− + =
− − −
−




+ −




= −
=


	
	
	


	
	
	
1 1
1
1 1 134 1
2
( )
( )( ),
( ) [( )] [ ( )] ( ) ( ) , , , ,...,
( ),
: :b b
b
δ θ
δ
ν
δ
, 
which are obtained from ( 55 ) to ( 57 ) with bt(⋅) substituted for bte ( )⋅ . The following lemma 
concerns welfare comparisons of two vectors of bidding functions. 
 
Lemma 2: Define the vector of constants α ≡ (α1, α3,…,α n−1 ) > 0, i.e. αt ≥ 0 for all 
t ∈ {1,3,...,n-1} and αt > 0 for at least one t ∈ {1,3,...,n-1}. Then EU(b) > EU(b + α). 
 
Proof: 
We proceed by recursion. From the upper term on the RHS of ( 59 ), we have 
( 60 ) EUnl−1 (b+α) - EUnl −1( )b  = 0. 
Further, 
EU EU
K
c
K K EU EUt
l
t
l
t
t
t
t
t t
l
t
l
− −
+ − = − −
−




+ − + −



1 1
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b b bα αδ α
ν
  , 
( 61 ) 
t= 1, 3, 4,…, n-1, 
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which is strictly negative provided that EU EUt
l
t
l( ) ( )b b+ −α   is non-positive and c > 1. 
Finally,  
( 62 ) EU EU EU EUtl tl tl tl− −+ − = + −1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b b bα αδ   , t = 2. 
Taking ( 60 ) to ( 62 ) together, establishes EU EUl l0 0( ) ( )b b+ <α  and by the definition of 
EU(b) the claim.           
 
Lemma 2 states that, for a given vector of bidding functions, the expected utility from 
participating in a bidding Rosca decreases if, in any of the auctions, all bidders add some 
positive constant to their bid. The reason is that higher bids force an auction’s winner to incur 
extra debt, while the losers of such an auction enjoy extra consumption from the higher 
amount which is redistributed to them. Since, by assumption, the marginal disutility from 
borrowing is bigger than the marginal utility from consumption, lower bids are preferred from 
an ex ante perspective. Lemma 2 implies that a group can increase the benefits from Rosca 
participation if all members symmetrically overbid less than in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
2.5 Structural Estimation of Rosca Auctions 
As mentioned above, in the present estimation, we will not force the theoretically computed 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium on the data because, as will become clear shortly, this potentially 
obscures interesting insights, which can be obtained from the data. With the considerations 
from the previous section in mind, it seems appropriate to allow for differences in the extent 
of overbidding. While still assuming that bidders bid symmetrically, we introduce the 
parameter ρ to allow for players' deviations from the Bayes-Nash equilibrium as follows: 
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( 63 )  b r
c
nm z r EU nm z
c
t t
t
t
t t
l t
t
ρ ν
ν
ρ ν θ
ν
( ) ( ) ( )( )≡ + − − +
−
+1 1 2  . 
If ρ = 1, bidders bid according to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. If ρ > (<) 1, bidders overbid 
(underbid) relative to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It further follows from Lemma 2 that ex 
ante expected utility from joining the Rosca is strictly decreasing in ρ.32 
Since this essay is the first attempt to analyse Rosca auctions econometrically, we first 
need to discuss some methodological issues concerning the estimation of standard auctions 
and relate them to the problems which the estimation of OA-Rosca auctions as modelled in 
this essay poses. In the existing literature on the parametric estimation of standard auctions, it 
is invariably assumed that each bidder's type υ is drawn from a hypothesised parametric 
distribution, H say. The major concern is whether the auction protocol is such that bidders tell 
the truth or not, since, if bidders tell the truth, the parameters characterising H can be 
estimated without further complication. If, like in standard first-price sealed bid or Dutch 
auctions, the bidding equilibrium does not involve truth-telling, however, observed winning 
                                               
32
 For Roscas with a variable commission (see footnote 26), we shall assume that the cost of 
the investment project each participant observes in each round is nm and that the 
participant who receives the last pot has to finance the last round’s fixed commission, zn 
say, by a loan at the cost of c. Then EU mn czn
l
n− = + −1 1δ θ( )  , equations ( 56 ), with z set 
equal to zero, and ( 57 ) remain valid and it can be shown that there exists the linear 
equilibrium bidding function b r
c
nmr EU nm
c
t
e
t
t
t
t t
l t
t
( ) ( )≡ + − + +
ν
ν
ν θ
ν1 1 2
  , where νt = Kt. 
Analogously to the fixed commission case, we define 
b r
c
nmr EU nm
c
t t
t
t
t t
l t
t
ρ ν
ν
ρ ν θ
ν
( ) ( )≡ + − + +1 1 2  . 
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bids in general depend on covariates and additional parameters, which enter into a bidder's 
hypothesised bidding function (see Hendricks and Paarsch, 1995). In the present case of OA-
Rosca auctions, it is immediately seen from ( 63 ) that each observed bid does not only 
depend on the parameter characterising the hypothesised distribution F, θ, but also on δ, c and 
ρ. Thus, econometrically, the present estimation of OA-Rosca auctions faces the same 
problem that was previously encountered in the estimation of standard first-price sealed bid 
and Dutch auctions. We will thus briefly review some of the literature concerned with this 
problem. 
Two parametric methods for the structural estimation of standard first-price sealed bid 
and Dutch auctions have been in use in the literature so far. First, generalised non-linear least 
squares, advocated by Laffont et al. (1995) for models where the moments of equilibrium bids 
cannot be computed explicitly, and, second, the method of maximum likelihood, whose non-
standard asymptotic properties have been derived by Donald and Paarsch (1996). 
We adopt the method of maximum likelihood (ML) because, first, it is much more 
efficient than the least squares approach, as Monte Carlo evidence by Paarsch (1994) 
indicates, and, second, the likelihood function for the (rather complicated) present structural 
econometric model behaves numerically better than the least squares objective function. ML 
estimation of the present model, however, suffers from a problem similar to the one analysed 
by Donald and Paarsch (1996), namely, that parameters which determine the boundary of the 
distribution have to be estimated. This violates an assumption used to prove the standard 
asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators (see Scholz, 1985). Donald and 
Paarsch (1996) consider first-price sealed bid and Dutch auctions with a minimum price 
which is assumed to be bigger than the lower bound of the support of the distribution from 
which the bidders’ values are drawn. Thus, within their framework, the lower bound of the 
values’ distribution poses no problem. However, since they consider distributions whose 
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support has a finite upper bound, α say, the difficulty arises from estimating α, which, in the 
more interesting cases, is a function of covariates and a vector of further parameters, β say. As 
a remedy, they suggest to maximise the observed bids’ log-likelihood subject to a set of 
inequality restrictions ensuring that the estimator β  is chosen such that none of the observed 
bids exceeds α (  )β . The asymptotics of β  are not standard and involve extreme value theory. 
A key assumption of their analysis is that, evaluated at α, the density function corresponding 
to the values’ distribution is bigger than zero. 
In the present case, each observed bid, bjw  say, is a linear function of a random 
variable which is the second highest order statistic from a sample of Kj exponential random 
variables, Kj ≥ 2. We write RK Kj j−1: ∼ GK Kj j− ⋅1 1: ( ; , )θ , where Gk K: ( ; , )⋅ ζ γ  is the distribution 
function of the k-th smallest order statistic from a sample of K random variables drawn from 
an exponential distribution with shift parameter ζ and scale parameter γ. By virtue of ( 63 ), 
Bj
w
 is distributed according to GK K j jj j− ⋅1: ( ; , )η ω , where 
η
ν ρθ
ν
j
j
j
j j j
j
j
l
cv
n m z
c
EU=
+
− +
+




−



1
1
1
( )  and ω ν
ν
θj
j j j j
j
n m z
c
=
−
+
( )
1
. 
Note that every quantity which depends on the specific characteristics of that Rosca auction 
from which Bjw  is sampled has been indexed with j. Defining G ≡ G1 1:  and g as the density 
function corresponding to G, the density of Bjw  can be written as 
 f b K K G b G b g bB j j j j
K
j j j jjw
j( ) ( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )≡ − −−1 12η ω η ω η ω     
( 64 ) 
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η
. 
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Suppose for a moment that we wanted to estimate η and ω from a sample of J winning 
bids which are all identically distributed. The log-likelihood for this estimation problem is 
( 65 )K
J
j j
j
J
J
b
J K K J K
b b
b
( , )
,
log ( ) log( ) ( )log exp ,
:
:
η ω
η
ω
η
ω
η
ω
η
≡
−∞ ≤
− − + − − −
−







−
−




>






=
∑
1
1
11 2 1 2 
. 
Note that, for all K ≥ 2, ML estimation is nonregular because the domain of Bw depends on η. 
For K = 2, K ( , )η ω  is strictly increasing in η as long as η < b1:J,  which means that 
K ( , )η ω  does not have an interior maximum w.r.t. η.33 Consequently, the ML estimator of η 
in this case is b J1: . If, moreover, η is a function of covariates xj (in our case xj = (mj, nj, zj, νj)) 
and a parameter vector β (in our case β = (δ, c, θ, ρ)), ML estimation of β is technically 
exactly the same problem as the one considered by Donald and Paarsch (1996) and involves 
extreme value theory. 
For K > 2, on the other hand, it is readily verified that K ( , )η ω  has an interior 
maximum. We will now show that, in this case, the theory developed by Smith (1985) applies. 
He considers probability densities of the form 
( 66 ) f y y h yK( ; , ) ( ) ( ; )η η ηφ φ= − −−2 , η ≤ y, K > 2, 
where η and
 
φ, the latter a vector, are unknown parameters and the function h tends to a 
constant (K-1)χ as y η. To see that Smith’s theory is valid for the present application, we 
need 
 
                                               
33
 In fact, for K = 2, Bw has an exponential distribution with shift parameter η and scale 
parameter ω/2. 
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Lemma 3: Let g yK K−1: ( ; , )η ω  denote the density function of the second highest order statistic 
from a sample of K random variables drawn from an exponential distribution with shift 
parameter η and scale parameter ω. Define hK (y - η; ω) ≡ g yK K−1: ( ; , )η ω ( )y K− −η 2  and 
χ η ω
ηK y K
h y≡ −

lim ( ; ) /(K-1). Then, for all K ≥ 2, χ ωK KK= −1 . 
 
Proof: 
First note that gK K− ⋅1: ( ; , )η ω  is equal to f Bjw ( )⋅  as given in ( 64 ) with the subscript j dropped 
throughout. It is easily verified that the derivative of gK K− ⋅1: ( ; , )η ω  has the following 
property: 
( 67 )  ∂ ∂ = −
−
−
− − −
g y
y
Kg y g yK K K K K K1
1
2 1 12: : :
( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( ; , )η ω ω η ω η ω  , K ≥ 3. 
Equation ( 67 ) may be used to prove the following representation of the L-th derivative of 
gK K− ⋅1: ( ; , )η ω  by induction. 
( 68 )  ∂
∂
= −



 −
−
− −
=
− − −∑
L
K K
L
L L l
l
L
K l K l
g y
y
L
l
K
K l
g y1
0
12: :
( ; , ) ( ) !( )! ( ; , )
η ω
ω η ω , L ≤ K – 2. 
Notice that gK K−1: ( ; , )η η ω  = 2/ω if K = 2 and gK K−1: ( ; , )η η ω  = 0 if K > 2. Together with 
( 68 ), this implies that ∂
∂
=
−
=
L
K K
L
y
g y
y
1 0:
|
( ; , )η ω
η
, if L < K – 2, and 
∂
∂
=
−
=
−
L
K K
L
y
Kg y
y
K1 1:
|
( ; , ) !η ω ω
η
, if L = K – 2. We can thus apply L’Hôpital’s rule (K – 2) times 
to obtain lim ( ; ) lim ( ; , )( )
!
( )!
:
y K y
K K
K
K
h y g y
y
K
K 
−
−
−
− =
−
=
−
η η
η ω η ω
η
ω1
2
1
2
. Recalling the definition of χ K , the 
result stated in Lemma 3 follows immediately.       
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Lemma 3 establishes that, abstracting from the presence of covariates, the present 
estimation problem is a special case of the nonregular class considered by Smith (1985), who 
shows that, 
(i) if K = 3, then the estimators which are obtained from maximising the likelihood, 
η  and ω , are consistent and asymptotically normal. While, for ω , the order of 
convergence is the usual O N( ).0 5 , where N denotes the sample size, η  converges 
faster to the true value of η, namely at an order of O N N([ log( )] ).0 5 . Although the 
expected information matrix does not exist, the inverse of the observed 
information matrix is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of 
η  and ω . 
(ii) if K > 3, standard asymptotic theory applies to η  and ω , i.e. both η  and ω  
converge at an order of O N( ).0 5 , and are asymptotically normally distributed. The 
asymptotic covariance matrix may be estimated consistently with the inverse of the 
observed information matrix. 
Although Smith only considers scalars η and ω, it is most likely that his results are valid for 
the present application where η and ω
 
are functions of covariates and further parameters. This 
conjecture is supported by Monte Carlo experiments which I conducted with artificial data. A 
formal proof of this conjecture, however, is well beyond the scope of the present study.34 
                                               
34
 To extend maximum likelihood theory derived for scalar parameters to the case where there 
are covariates and further parameters can be very tedious, as the history of the Tobit 
estimator illustrates. While Hald (1949) had derived results for the estimation of a 
truncated normal distribution, it took another 15 years from Tobin’s (1958) suggestion of a 
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To summarise, for observed bids from auctions with three or more bidders, the 
likelihood function is continuous and has an interior maximum. Moreover, although the 
estimation problem is nonregular, usual methods of estimation and inference appear to be 
applicable. It is only the data from next to last Rosca rounds, which do not allow estimation 
by standard methods. Since, in the present case, the likelihood is a very complicated function 
of the parameters δ, c, θ and ρ, it is essential that the likelihood function have an interior 
maximum. For this reason, we drop the 8 observations from auctions with only two bidders. 
In a first step, we use all remaining 141 observations for the estimation including 36 
winning bids which stem from auctions where the winner’s purpose was known to the other 
bidders at the beginning of the auction, i.e. where the private information assumption is 
violated. Table 6 shows the distribution of those winning bids which are used for the 
estimation with respect to the date of the auction and the contribution. The seemingly 
irregular pattern of recorded winning bids over time is due to the fact that, in the second round 
of each Rosca, there is no auction and thus no winning bid. 
                                                                                                                                                   
truncated normal model with covariates to Amemiya’s (1973) proof of the asymptotic 
properties of the Tobit model, which are, in principle, absolutely standard in all respects. 
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Throughout the estimation we will assume that all individuals have identical preferences, 
namely the same discount factor δ, that all individuals are confronted with the same cost for 
external funds c, and that, within a given Rosca, bidders bid symmetrically. We will abstract from 
any problem that potential simultaneous participation in several Roscas and other forms of 
unobserved heterogeneity among the participants causes. Such heterogeneity could be due to 
permanent individual characteristics such as different access to credit as well as considerations of 
Rosca group formation where, for example, an individual without a daughter who is due to marry 
soon would choose to join a group without any fathers of such daughters. These hypotheses can be 
tested neither with the organiser sample, which does not contain information on bidders’ identities, 
nor with the participant sample, which, except for one case, does not include simultaneous 
membership of several respondents in the same Rosca. 
For this first estimation, we will, moreover, assume that all participants face the same 
distribution of returns, which is characterised by θ, and that the extent of overbidding, ρ, is the same 
in all Roscas. 
When both δ and c are taken as free parameters in the likelihood function, the likelihood 
maximisation does not converge. Instead, irrespective of the starting values, δ approaches zero 
while c grows without limit. We thus impose some more structure on the model by assuming that 
the instantaneous disutility from borrowing is equivalent to the disutility from an annuity in which 
the borrower has to pay an interest of i in all following periods for each Rupee borrowed. Assuming 
that the principal is never repaid, we thus substitute iδ/(1-δ) = iδ τ
τ =
∞∑ 1  for c, where i is the 
moneylender interest rate for a spell of one Rosca period, i.e., on average, six months. For bigger 
loans for investment purposes, 5% per month (with no compound interest within one year) is the 
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going interest rate in E. We thus calibrate our model to the credit market conditions in E by setting 
i = 0.3 and substituting 0.3δ/(1-δ) for c in ( 63 ).35 
 
Table 7. Results for the basic model 
Parameter Explanation Estimate STD* T 
δ Individual discount factor 0.853 0.004 230.564 
θ 
Average profitability of 
the investment project 0.272 0.018 14.946 
ρ Extent of overbidding 4.599 0.637 7.221 
 	
 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The estimates of δ and θ appear to have a reasonable order of magnitude. The estimate of δ 
implies that the individual discount rate amounts to about half of the discount factor implicit in 
loans when i = 0.3. Moreover, within our modelling framework, the expected return on investment, 
1 + θ, is somewhat lower than the cost of credit. The estimate of ρ, which is well above unity, 
shows that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium cannot be forced onto the data successfully. The likelihood 
function appears to be pseudoconcave. A gridsearch with several different starting values was 
undertaken but convergence always occurred at the values given in Table 7. 
A thorough analysis of the residuals of this first estimation points to the following, 
potentially significant determinants of observed winning bids: 
                                               
35
 Using a lognormal distribution for bidders’ values, Laffont et al. (1995) also encounter 
convergence problems in their estimation of Dutch auctions for eggplants among wholesalers in 
Marmande, France. Compared to the ad hoc way in which they fix the shape of the lognormal 
distribution by using the logarithmic variance of eggplant prices in the retail market, our 
calibration of the costs of credit is quite innocent. 
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1) In big Roscas (contribution of Rs. 3000 or more), winning bids are relatively higher and 
relatively wider dispersed than in Roscas with small contributions. 
2) Observed winning bids in winter auctions are, on average, higher than in autumn auctions. 
3) Winning bids in Roscas of experienced organisers are smaller than in Roscas of newcomer-
organisers. 
4) Within groups which have run more than one Rosca before, winning bids appear to be 
lower. 
5) Irrespective of the winner’s purpose, winning bids in auctions with public information 
appear to be lower than in auctions with private information. 
Some of these observations can be justified in a straightforward fashion. As to the first observation, 
there is evidence from the participant sample that the size of the contribution is highly correlated 
with the operational landholdings of a household (see Table 4). A household which operates a large 
area can be expected to be more experienced in operating a field plot profitably than a household 
which is primarily engaged in agricultural wage labour. It is thus plausible to expect that, on 
average, the revenue from a given field plot is higher for households which participate in Roscas 
with a big contribution. An increase in the revenue parameter θ, however, also scales up the 
distribution of winning bids. 
Turning to observation 2, if one wins a winter auction, the money can be used for productive 
investment in the autumn crop. According to farmers and paddy merchants, the autumn crop in E is 
about 50% more profitable than the winter crop. Thus, returns on investment after the winter 
harvest should, on average, be higher than after the autumn harvest. Of course, the extent of this 
effect depends on how long-lived the investment is and on the degree of individual impatience. 
Ideally, one would want to introduce a fixed effect not only for seasonality but for each harvest to 
control for potential macro factors, such as crop failures and price fluctuations in the market for 
paddy. As Table 6 reveals, however, this would require another 16 dummies, which costs too many 
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degrees of freedom. For the time period in question, severe deviations from usual harvest yields 
were only reported for the harvests in autumn 1993, winter 1994 (due to insect damage) and autumn 
1997 (due to heavy rains during the harvest). 
As to observation 3, all organisers whom I interviewed pointed out that high bidding is bad 
for an organiser's reputation (see also observation 9 in section 2.2.4). Also, according to organisers, 
a high winning bid decreases a winner’s motivation to follow up his obligation to pay future Rosca 
contributions and thus causes the organiser trouble. Experienced organisers often explained that, 
when a Rosca ends, they would not invite those participants to new Roscas who regularly drive up 
the bid more than usual. 
Observation 4 is particularly interesting because, if one is willing to believe that the average 
revenue from investment projects is the same for Rosca groups which have been existing for several 
years and those which have newly formed, it suggests that, as a group gathers experience, social 
gains from lower bidding can be realised that new groups miss by bidding more excessively. As to 
observation 5, note that, in our data, of the 36 observations with public information, 23 were 
‘emergencies’, i.e. the marriage or puberty function of a daughter or a close relative. In only one of 
these 36 cases did the winner buy a field plot. 
Ideally, one would want to determine whether each of the factors mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs affects auction outcomes through the revenue distribution or through the extent of 
overbidding, or through both. Unfortunately, such an identification is not possible with the present 
data. Instead, when e.g. a dummy for seasonality is included both for θ and for ρ, these dummies 
start to build each other up. Therefore, based on the above reasoning, we impose some structure on 
the dummies and slope coefficients which will now be introduced by admitting only either θ or ρ to 
be a function of each of them. 
In particular, we will assume that the amount of the contribution to a Rosca and seasonality 
matter only for the revenue of an investment project, whereas the number of Roscas a group has run 
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before and the experience of the organiser matter only for the extent of overbidding. All these 
factors will be included into the structural model as permanent characteristics of a Rosa, i.e. the said 
features alter the bidding function in each auction and participants include these features into their 
expectations about future auctions. On the other hand, when unforeseen macro shocks such as crop 
failures are concerned, we will assume that any resulting changes in observed bids are transitory, 
i.e. expectations about future auctions are not affected by such events. The same will be assumed to 
detect whether overbidding is more or less pronounced in auctions where the winner’s purpose was 
publicly known before the auction. Formally, let us write the bidding function and the expected 
utility of an auction’s loser as functions of possibly different sets of the model parameters, i.e. 
( 69 )  b r
c
nm z r EU nm z
c
t t
t
t
t t
l
t
t
ρ δ θ ρ ν
δ ν
ρ ν θ
ν δ
( , , , ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ( ))1 1 1
1
21 1
≡
+
− − +
−
+
  , 
where, as defined above, c(δ) = 0.3δ/(1-δ) and 
( 70 )  EU EUtl tl≡ ( , , )δ θ ρ2 2 . 
Permanent characteristics are reflected by θ1, ρ1 and θ2, ρ2, while transitory characteristics only 
affect one auction and are thus only reflected by θ1, ρ1. We can now define 
θ1 = θ0 + θm (m/1000-1) +θseas +θ972, 
θ2 = θ0 + θm (m/1000-1) +θseas, 
where θseas equals zero when the observation stems from an auction after an autumn harvest and 
θ972 is a dummy on θ1 for the failed harvest in the autumn of 1997. We do not include dummies for 
the failed harvests in autumn 1993 and winter 1994 because, as Table 6 reveals, only three winning 
bids belonging to these latter harvests are in the data. We further define 
 ρ1 = ρ0 + ρcb RB + ρcbsq RB2 + ρorg OE + ρnocomm + ρpubl,nomarr + ρpubl,marr, 
ρ2 = ρ0 + ρcb RB + ρcbsq RB2 + ρorg OE + ρnocomm, 
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where RB is the number of bidding Roscas the group in question has run before (ranges between 
zero and three), OE is the number of Roscas the organiser reports to have organised before having 
started the Rosca in question (ranges between zero and eight), ρpubl,nomarr is a dummy which is 
different from zero only when the winner’s purpose was publicly known before the auction and he 
used the money for a productive purpose, and ρpubl,marr is a dummy which is different from zero 
only when the winner’s purpose was publicly known before the auction and he used the money for a 
marriage or puberty function. ρnocomm is a dummy for Roscas where the organiser does not receive a 
fixed commission in each round but instead shares the winning bid with the auction’s losers in each 
round (see footnotes 26 and 32). We introduce ρnocomm to see whether our model accommodates both 
commission regimes satisfactorily. 
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Table 8. Results for the augmented model 
Parameter Explanation Estimate* STD** T 
δ Individual discount factor 0.843 0.003 261.175 
θ0 
Average profitability of investment 
project 
0.168 0.016 10.508 
θm 
Change in θ as a function of the Rosca 
contribution 
0.017 0.007 2.385 
θseas Dummy on θ for winter auctions 0.027 0.012 2.295 
θ972 Dummy on θ for the 1997 autumn auction 0.054 0.026 2.102 
ρ0 Extent of overbidding 6.012 0.766 7.852 
ρcb 
Change in ρ as a linear function of the 
number of Roscas the group had before 
2.520 1.086 2.320 
ρcbsq 
Change in ρ as a quadratic function of 
the number of Roscas the group had 
before 
-1.141 0.460 -2.480 
ρorg 
Change in ρ as a function of the 
organiser's experience 
-0.622 0.199 -3.125 
ρpubl,nomarr 
Dummy on ρ for public information and 
purpose other than marriage 
-2.895 1.086 -2.666 
ρpubl,marr 
Dummy on ρ for public information and 
purpose = marriage 
-1.393 0.816 -1.708 
ρnocomm 
Dummy on ρ for Roscas where the 
organiser shares the winning bid 
-1.412 0.720 -1.962 
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Before we discuss the results, we briefly turn to some diagnostics. First, and most 
importantly, residuals are not trending with respect to Rosca rounds, which means that the 
intertemporal structure of our model is capable of explaining the intertemporal pattern of observed 
bids successfully. Further, we repeated the estimation for several values of i within a range of 0.15 
and 0.60 without obtaining qualitatively different results. Another issue which needs to be clarified 
is whether it is indeed advantageous for a winner to invest the funds obtained from the Rosca 
instead of using the money for consumption. Recall that, for investment, the amount of the winning 
bid has to be financed by a loan. If we consider the worst case for a winner, namely that the rate of 
return he observes is only marginally higher than that of the second highest bidder, we find that an 
investment’s net profit, (njmj - zj)(bjρ
−1 (bjw ) – 1) - cbjw , is negative in about 17% of the cases in our 
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data. Note that the inverse function bjρ
−1 (bjw ) gives the return on investment of the second highest 
bidder. In contrast, if we calculate the expected net profit of a winner conditional on the observed 
winning bid, i.e. if we replace bjρ
−1 (bjw ) by E R R b bK K K K j jwj j j j[ | ( )]: : >
−ρ 1
, we find that it is 
advantageous to invest in all cases in our data. Thus, although the expected net profit is always 
positive, one assumption of our model may be violated with positive probability, although in a 
rather limited number of cases. 
We now turn to the estimation results. At conventional levels, there is statistically significant 
evidence that, on average, participants who pay a higher contribution face higher revenues from 
investment. The estimate of θm suggests that the average net profit from investment is about 40% 
higher in Roscas with a contribution of Rs. 5000 than in Roscas with a contribution of Rs. 1000. 
Seasonality shows the expected sign, as does the dummy for the crop failure in the autumn of 1997. 
On the one hand, after such a failure, money expected from the harvest is missing which individuals 
might have planned to use for several purposes, be it agricultural inputs or the repair of one’s house. 
Thus, provided that the marginal product of such expenditures is sufficiently high, θ can be 
expected to be higher than after an ordinary autumn harvest. On the other hand, after such a failure, 
there may be particularly profitable opportunities in the market for field plots because some farmers 
may be forced to sell some land to compensate the crop failure, which would also increase θ. 
According to the winners’ purposes after the said harvest, agricultural inputs do not appear but, 
instead, productive investment is recorded in ten of eleven cases where the winner’s purpose is 
known (purchase of a field plot, 6 times, repair of the winner’s house, 3 times, purchase of bullocks, 
once, daughter’s marriage, once, unknown, once). 
The experience of an organiser appears to be an important determinant of the extent of 
competitiveness reflected by winning bids. This relationship is likely due to both the selection of 
participants based on the organiser's experience and a certain skill many organisers have pointed at 
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to influence people to bid reasonably. One means to influence bidders could stem from the fact that 
organisers often have more information than other bidders because it was frequently reported that 
bidders tell the organiser before an auction for what they need money and how much they would be 
willing to pay, while they keep this information hidden from the other bidders. 
The fact that ρnocomm is borderline significant at common levels indicates that our model may 
not be capable of fitting both commission regimes, fixed and variable, satisfactorily. If we do not 
construe the likelihood of the variable commission outcomes (57 observations) as described in 
footnote 32, but, in a rather descriptive fashion, treat them as generated by a fixed commission 
regime, ρnocomm’s T-value becomes even smaller than –2 indicating that there are welfare-relevant 
differences associated with the commission regime. This finding is counterintuitive at first sight 
because one would expect a conflict of interest for an organiser who receives a share of the winning 
bid. As mentioned above, on the one hand, there are various reasons for an organiser to try to keep 
winning bids at a moderate level. If, on the other hand, he receives a share of the winning bid, then, 
in each auction, his payoff is increasing in the winning bid. We suspect that lower bidding in 
variable commission Roscas reflects another factor in the background, which does not appear 
explicitly in our data. This is indicated by the fact that – although winning bids tend to be lower - 
the variable commission amounts to an average of 5.5% of the collected contributions while this 
figure ranges between 2 and 5% in the Roscas with a fixed commission. While a fixed commission 
of more than 5% is considered unacceptable in the village, a variable commission is widely 
accepted and not questioned. It could thus be that, on average, those organisers who are more 
capable and/or experienced realise that a variable commission regime is more profitable for them, 
but that, at the same time, the said organisers perform better in keeping bidding at moderate levels 
by the means mentioned in the previous paragraph. In this case, the organiser's conflict of interest 
would be resolved in favour of keeping the bidding less aggressive because experienced organisers 
are aware of the negative long-term consequences of unrestrained bidding for their Rosca business. 
   
 
96 
An interesting finding is the inverted U-shape of the relationship between the number of 
Roscas a group had run before and the extent of overbidding. The estimates of ρcb and ρcbsq imply 
that, when a group had three Roscas before, the extent of overbidding is less than half of that of a 
group which had one Rosca before. Following the estimates, overbidding is more pronounced in 
groups which had one Rosca before, than in newly formed groups. When more than one Rosca has 
been run before, the extent of overbidding decreases sharply.36 This finding can be interpreted in 
two ways. First, it could be the outcome of a learning process which involves bounded rationality. 
According to this story, after the first Rosca, participants speculate that something can be gained 
from bidding more aggressively. As they find that this is not the case, observed bids become lower 
in future Roscas.37 Second, it could point at differences between a one shot and a repeated game 
scenario. In this interpretation, the group gathers experience during the first two Roscas. As the 
members observe each other in many auctions, punishment by exclusion or social pressure for 
                                               
36
 If only a linear term is included, an estimate of only –0.1 obtains. 
37
 There is a growing literature on learning in repeated auctions. For first-price common value 
auctions, Garvin and Kagel (1994) find that inexperienced bidders suffer from the winner’s curse 
while experienced bidders approximate the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, in repeated 
independent private value auctions, Güth et al. (1999b) do not find convergence to a risk neutral 
Nash equilibrium. Further topics concerning learning directions and cognitive versus non-
cognitive learning (see Güth et al., 1999a; Roth and Erev, 1995; Selten and Buchta, 1998) cannot 
be explored with the present data since they do not contain information on each bidder’s identity. 
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excessive bidding becomes feasible and enforceable.38 By that way, a group can realise social (i.e. 
ex ante) gains from lower bidding. 
Another permanent characteristic of each Rosca group, its composition with respect to caste, 
was originally also included as an explanatory variable for the degree of overbidding. As in the 
estimation of the determinants of Rosca participation (see Table 4), however, the corresponding 
coefficient was highly insignificant. To save degrees of freedom, the variable 'caste' is not included 
in the estimation results presented in Table 8. 
The dummy for auction outcomes when the winner needs money for a publicly known 
marriage or puberty function has a negative sign but is only on the borderline of significance at 
conventional levels. Lower winning bids in such cases indicate that Rosca participants show a co-
operative behaviour, which is likely based on reciprocity and social enforcement. It is well known 
that when information on an individual’s situation is publicly observable, self-enforcing reciprocal 
relationships can be implemented in a straightforward fashion (see Coate and Ravallion, 1993, for a 
theoretical analysis of bilateral consumption insurance). Organisers pointed out that it is considered 
improper behaviour to raise the bid as usual when some other bidder has an ‘emergency’.39 In one 
case, an organiser explained a particularly high winning bid as retaliation against a participant who, 
                                               
38
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the gains from repeated Rosca participation 
rigorously. There is, however, a considerable literature on the gains from enduring relationships 
under private information in the context of consumption insurance (see Wang, 1995, for a recent 
contribution). 
39
 Bouman (1979) reports such 'crafty' bidding practices when information on a bidder's need of 
funds is public. 
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in previous rounds, used to take advantage of other bidder’s need but then declared that he needed a 
pot urgently himself. 
On the other hand, the pronounced negative dummy for the 13 observations with a publicly 
known purpose other than a marriage or puberty function is puzzling on first sight because it runs 
against the common wisdom in the village that a productive purpose should be always kept secret 
since otherwise other bidders would take advantage of one’s desire to obtain the pot. It is, therefore, 
worthwhile to look at these 13 observations in more detail. As mentioned above, only in one case 
was the pot used for the purchase of a field, which is the most common use in the private 
information category. The bulk of winners in the public information case, instead, needed money to 
repair their house (6) or settle debt (3). It is likely that the need to repair one's house (which, in E, is 
mostly not a cosmetic, but a vital operation) and, in certain instances, also to repay debt is evident 
to other bidders and that therefore the auction outcomes in those cases also reflect the co-operative 
behaviour, which Rosca participants show in the case of publicly known marriages.40 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this essay, the symmetric, independent private value bidder framework for the analysis of 
auctions has been applied to develop a stochastic model which reflects the basic features of bidding 
Roscas in a typical agricultural village of south India. Using the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the 
theoretical model as a benchmark, the addition of a parameter which reflects the extent of 
                                               
40
 Inclusion of a dummy for the purposes renovating house and settling debt in private information 
auctions gives no significant result indicating that, in general, the revenue of the said purposes 
appears to be similar to the more frequently mentioned purposes under private information such 
as buying a field plot or livestock. 
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overbidding, a notorious phenomenon in Rosca auctions, makes the theoretical model flexible 
enough to fit the data from 141 Rosca auctions satisfactorily. The stochastic nature of the theoretical 
model allows an econometric specification without introducing an ad hoc error term. In the case of 
Rosca auctions, structural estimation seems inevitable because, at least when data from informal 
Roscas are used, typically not any two observations are identically distributed, flawing any attempt 
to conduct reduced form inference. 
We have found that aggregate factors like seasonality in agriculture and harvest failures are 
reflected by Rosca-auction outcomes and that bidding in Roscas with a big contribution is 
substantially different from bidding in Roscas with a small contribution. We have shown that, 
theoretically, if a Rosca group can adopt less aggressive bidding, social gains can be realised. In this 
connection, we have found evidence that groups of experienced organisers bid less aggressively 
than groups of newcomer-organisers. Moreover, groups which have operated more than one Rosca 
before bid less aggressively than Rosca groups with no or only a short history. 
We find evidence that, when a bidder has a pecuniary emergency like the marriage of a 
daughter or the need to repair his house and this information is revealed before the auction, auction 
outcomes are more favourable for the winner, which indicates a certain degree of co-operation 
based on reciprocity among Rosca participants when information is public. 
This essay is the first attempt to open up the formerly black box of Rosca auctions with 
econometric methods. Many questions, however, remain for future research, e.g.: What are the 
determinants of auction outcomes of Roscas in other settings, e.g. of urban Roscas? When 
investment opportunities are correlated between Rosca participants, can a common value approach 
also be successfully applied to Rosca data? Are less restrictive probability distributions or even 
semi-parametric methods, which yield models that cannot be calculated explicitly, practically 
feasible for the analysis of Rosca auctions? 
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2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table 9. The organiser sample 
hh Rosca 
number 
m n caste org z zl date t purp publ bw 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 197 1 11 1 27500 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 198 3 1 0 34300 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 298 4 10 1 21600 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 199 5 7 0 18000 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 299 6 7 0 11000 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 100 7 10 1 13000 
53 1 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 200 8 5 0 12500 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 296 1 21 1 10350 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 297 3 3 1 8000 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 198 4 21 1 7100 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 298 5 11 1 10500 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 199 6 11 0 5150 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 299 7 11 1 3200 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 100 8 11 1 6000 
53 2 2000 10 0.9 0 1000 1000 200 9 7 1 3000 
63 1 3000 11 0.318 0 1320 1320 199 1 0 0 21680 
63 1 3000 11 0.318 0 1320 1320 100 3 1 0 18180 
63 1 3000 11 0.318 0 1320 1320 200 4 1 0 17180 
63 2 2000 11 0.636 0 880 880 299 1 3 1 10220 
63 2 2000 11 0.636 0 880 880 200 3 3 1 6820 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 297 1 3 1 19000 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 298 3 0 0 11350 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 199 4 0 0 10550 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 299 5 1 0 8000 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 100 6 0 0 8650 
64 1 3000 10 0.3 1 0 1001 200 7 1 0 7000 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 297 1 1 0 24100 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 298 3 7 0 27400 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 199 4 3 0 20300 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 299 5 1 0 16500 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 100 6 10 0 20100 
123 1 5000 10 0.85 1 0 0 200 7 3 0 19000 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 292 1 0 0 11750 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 293 3 0 0 10500 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 194 4 14 0 11050 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 294 5 11 0 10200 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 195 6 15 0 9200 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 295 7 10 0 9650 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 196 8 1 0 8800 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 296 9 3 0 8000 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 197 10 1 0 8550 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 297 11 4 0 6800 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 198 12 1 0 6750 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 298 13 1 0 6000 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 199 14 3 0 3500 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 299 15 10 0 3000 
123 2 1000 17 0.8235 1 0 500 100 16 1 0 2500 
146 1 2000 10 0.6 1 0 1000 198 1 1 0 9000 
146 1 2000 10 0.6 1 0 1000 199 3 7 0 6000 
146 1 2000 10 0.6 1 0 1000 299 4 2 0 5300 
146 1 2000 10 0.6 1 0 1000 100 5 1 0 5700 
146 1 2000 10 0.6 1 0 1000 200 6 1 0 4500 
146 2 2000 10 0.8 1 0 1000 198 1 0 0 12000 
146 2 2000 10 0.8 1 0 1000 199 3 0 0 8100 
146 2 2000 10 0.8 1 0 1000 299 4 0 1 6800 
146 2 2000 10 0.8 1 0 1000 100 5 0 0 5050 
146 2 2000 10 0.8 1 0 1000 200 6 0 0 4500 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 197 1 1 0 10100 
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146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 198 3 5 0 6450 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 298 4 10 1 6800 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 199 5 3 0 6210 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 299 6 10 1 4800 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 100 7 4 0 4200 
146 3 2000 10 1 1 0 1000 200 8 30 0 4000 
146 4 3000 10 1 1 0 1500 298 1 1 0 14000 
146 4 3000 10 1 1 0 1500 299 3 16 0 12000 
146 4 3000 10 1 1 0 1500 100 4 10 1 8000 
146 4 3000 10 1 1 0 1500 200 5 1 0 6000 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 297 1 1 0 6250 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 298 3 2 0 5350 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 199 4 1 0 5975 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 299 5 16 0 4100 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 100 6 12 0 3750 
156 1 1000 10 0.9 1 0 500 200 7 2 0 2600 
156 2 700 10 0.9 1 0 350 298 1 21 0 3250 
156 2 700 10 0.9 1 0 350 299 3 9 0 2900 
156 2 700 10 0.9 1 0 350 100 4 1 0 2400 
156 2 700 10 0.9 1 0 350 200 5 16 0 3400 
157 1 5000 11 0.727 0 2500 2500 100 1 1 0 30000 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 195 1 1 0 40500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 196 3 10 1 37500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 296 4 13 1 30500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 197 5 10 0 30500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 297 6 1 0 32500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 198 7 10 1 24600 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 298 8 1 0 26500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 199 9 10 1 24500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 299 10 11 1 24500 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 100 11 6 1 10000 
157 2 5000 13 0.846 0 2500 2500 200 12 11 1 8000 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 196 1 32 0 27200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 197 3 3 0 26200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 297 4 1 0 25200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 198 5 3 0 25200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 298 6 1 0 19900 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 199 7 3 0 20200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 299 8 10 1 17600 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 100 9 5 0 16200 
157 4 3000 14 0.857 0 1800 1800 200 10 1 0 12200 
157 5 5000 13 0.769 0 3000 3000 100 1 10 0 49000 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 193 1 10 1 8000 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 194 3 1 0 8800 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 294 4 22 0 8350 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 195 5 4 0 7750 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 295 6 9 0 7250 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 196 7 3 0 6550 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 296 8 0 0 4250 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 197 9 8 0 6000 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 297 10 10 1 5500 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 198 11 11 1 4600 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 298 12 3 0 3700 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 199 13 3 1 2500 
182 2 1000 15 1 0 750 750 299 14 1 0 2000 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 296 1 0 0 5600 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 297 3 0 0 4600 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 198 4 0 0 4100 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 298 5 0 0 3100 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 199 6 0 0 2600 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 299 7 0 0 2600 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 100 8 0 0 2400 
195 2 1000 10 1 0 400 400 200 9 0 0 2100 
199 1 2000 10 0.9 0 500 500 299 1 10 1 8500 
199 1 2000 10 0.9 0 500 500 200 3 1 0 7500 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 196 1 4 0 4000 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 197 3 9 0 4500 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 297 4 1 0 4850 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 198 5 5 0 5575 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 298 6 21 0 4700 
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199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 199 7 9 0 4550 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 299 8 11 1 1550 
199 2 1000 10 0.9 0 500 500 100 9 31 1 2000 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 195 1 2 0 28000 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 196 3 11 1 24100 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 296 4 0 0 17100 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 197 5 1 0 32000 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 297 6 3 0 25000 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 198 7 21 1 7900 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 298 8 10 1 9500 
199 3 5000 10 0.9 0 2500 2500 199 9 1 0 5500 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 295 1 3 1 11540 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 296 3 3 0 9040 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 197 4 33 0 10040 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 297 5 1 0 8540 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 198 6 10 1 7740 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 298 7 1 1 7040 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 199 8 7 0 6040 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 299 9 30 1 5040 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 100 10 1 0 3540 
500 2 2000 12 1 0 960 960 200 11 1 1 2740 
 
Legend 
hh:   household number of the organiser 
Rosca number: consecutive number for the Roscas of each organiser household 
m:   contribution to the Rosca 
n:   number of participants in the Rosca 
caste:   fraction of caste Hindus in the Rosca 
org:   commission regime (0: fixed commission, 1: variable commission) 
z:   fixed commission in each round except the last 
zl:   fixed commission in the last round 
date [YXX]: time when the auction took place, Y = 1 winter harvest, Y=2 autumn harvest, 
XX: Year 
t: round in which the auction took place 
purp: purpose of the winner (see Table 10) 
publ: public (=1) or private (=0) information on the winner’s purpose before the 
auction 
bw:   winning bid 
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Table 10. Purpose codes in Table 9 
purp Purpose 
0 unknown 
1 buy field or oti* 
2 start moneylender business 
3 buy or repair house 
4 buy bullocks or bullock cart 
5 buy milk animal 
6 buy motor bike 
7 start or improve a non-agricultural business, bribe for getting a job 
8 start banana planting 
9 agricultural inputs 
10 daughter's marriage 
11 other relative's marriage (sister, son, participant himself) 
12 buy jewels, other jewels had become old 
13 puberty function 
14 consumption because of income shortage 
15 medical treatment 
16 agricultural inputs to compensate crop failure 
20 release pawn 
21 repay debt 
22 release mortgaged field 
30 buy jewels 
31 domestic purposes 
32 children's education 
33 household utensils for daughter 
* Oti is a contract where a landowner leases a field plot without receiving a lease payment or a 
share of the yield. Instead he once receives a lump amount of money from the tenant, which he has 
to return to the tenant at the end of the contract. Rosca funds are used by tenants to lease in a field 
on oti. 
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3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature on bidding 
Roscas. What both essays have in common is that they assume a private information environment 
and build on what we have defined as stochastic models of bidding Roscas, by which is meant that, 
during the course of a Rosca, participants are affected by random variables which are not yet 
realised when they join a Rosca. In the first essay, these random variables represent income shocks, 
and a bidding Rosca generates gains from intertemporal trade by facilitating risk sharing among risk 
averse individuals. In the second essay, these random variables represent the returns on investment 
opportunities, and a bidding Rosca enables participants to obtain funds when they observe a 
particularly profitable investment project. Evidence from the field study underlying the second 
essay, moreover, suggests that the private information assumption is a good benchmark for the 
modelling of Rosca auctions - even in a largely closed agricultural village, where information can 
be expected to flow more freely than in other settings where Roscas are found. 
 Of the four existing theoretical papers which consider bidding Roscas, only one (Kuo, 1993) 
employs a stochastic model, while the other three (Besley et al., 1993, 1994; Kovsted and Lyk-
Jensen, 1999) use deterministic models to analyse various aspects of random and bidding Roscas. 
Motivated by evidence in the informal literature on bidding Roscas, which points overwhelmingly 
to the stochastic form, both chapters of this dissertation aim at redressing this imbalance between 
the analysis of deterministic and stochastic Rosca models. At this point, we will spare the reader the 
tedium of a full-scale repetition of the concluding sections of the individual essays, but the 
following results should be highlighted. In the first essay we have shown that, under plausible 
assumptions on individual preferences, participation in a single bidding Rosca offers risk sharing 
among risk averse individuals when they are confronted with independently-distributed, privately-
observed income streams. The auctions in the course of a bidding Rosca bring about a net transfer 
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from the better to the worse off bidder each time a pot is auctioned and thereby overcome 
information asymmetries. 
So far, there has not been any econometric analysis of Rosca auctions. This is surprising 
given the growing number of econometric papers which are concerned with the determinants of 
participation in Roscas. Perhaps one reason is that Rosca auctions cannot be tackled with basic 
econometric tools because, typically, all auctions are different from one-another. The existing 
econometric papers on Roscas, however, do not go beyond the level of using Heckman-type 
selection models. In this connection, the stochastic approach to bidding Roscas has also served us 
well in the empirical essay because it allows us to create a structure, which is needed to make the 
outcomes of heterogeneous auctions comparable. No existing deterministic Rosca model could have 
accommodated our diverse data without introducing an ad hoc error term. I hope that the third 
chapter will stimulate more econometric research on Rosca auctions because, as has been shown, 
such a quantitative analysis reveals many aspects which a qualitatively oriented researcher cannot 
discover. For example, we have found that observed winning bids in Rosca auctions respond to the 
experience of the Rosca organiser as well as to the number of Roscas the group in question has run 
before. Further, any empirical study greatly benefits from the possibility of comparing quantitative 
with narrative evidence, as the comparison of auction outcomes with private and public information 
in the second chapter shows. 
 To conclude, I think that further theoretical research on Roscas has to pay more attention to 
what has been empirically observed. For example, all four existing theoretical papers on Rosca 
auctions deal with auction protocols which are not reported in any of the empirical literature. For 
that reason, the notion of overbidding, which is cited by much empirical research on Rosca 
auctions, has not been an issue in any of these papers. Actual Roscas have characteristics and 
properties which still await a thorough theoretical analysis. To give an example, the role played by a 
Rosca organiser and how he can optimise his Rosca business is still an open issue. Another topic 
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which deserves theoretical attention is the empirically relevant allotment mechanism where the 
organiser decides which active participant receives the pot. In this case, there is scope for bribing 
the organiser, which, in turn, could be modelled as an auction. 
In this dissertation, we have not analysed Roscas in the context of other financial 
arrangements which play an important role in many settings where Roscas are frequently observed, 
like interlinked transactions and loans from moneylenders and pawn brokers. While Besley et al. 
(1994) have addressed this issue within a deterministic scenario, more research is needed to 
compare the efficiency of different empirically relevant arrangements in contexts where stochastic 
Rosca models are appropriate. Another open issue is a household's portfolio decision on how to 
allocate its financial resources to Roscas and other financial institutions. 
On the empirical side, the determinants of Rosca participation have, in my opinion, been 
investigated quite thoroughly. Existing research, however, treats the course of a Rosca as a black 
box. Instead, more work is needed on what goes on inside a Rosca. In this connection, other Rosca-
auction models than the one presented in the second chapter could be applied to Rosca-auction data. 
Also, the matter of Rosca-group formation has not yet received the attention it deserves, neither 
theoretically nor empirically. 
 At present, the community of Rosca researchers among economists is small but well-
connected. I hope that this dissertation will stimulate more research on this institution, which can 
serve as a fruitful and intriguing field for theorists and econometricians alike. 
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